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INTRODUCTION
Classic liberal theory sees each of us as individuals who
may or may not happen to form shifting alliances with others to
maximize our own best interests. If the public good exists,' it
emerges from the aggregation of these individual interests.
Children pose a challenge for this view because they depend on
others to protect them. Young children can neither define their
own best interests nor effectively bargain for them in the political
arena. Hence, liberal political theory that rests on a social con-
tract between equal, autonomous actors has a hard time accom-
modating the very idea of childhood.2
Children have few rights in a system in which rights derive
from autonomy. Although rights can be classified in different
ways, and different kinds of rights may have different sources,3
legally enforceable claims arise only from legislatures and courts.
In litigation, we have long been willing to allow parents or "next
friends" to represent children;4 however, children are excluded
from the legislative process because only those capable of decid-
ing issues for themselves can participate. Because political
rights seem to depend on autonomy, children are barred from
the political process of interest group bargaining that takes
place in a democracy.
This exclusion from politics harms children, stigmatizing
them as less than full members of the polity.5 The harm is not
1 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-
60 (2d ed. 1963) (arguing that it is impossible to determine the common good
separate from individual preferences).
2. Several commentators have noted the failure of liberal theory to account
for children. See generally, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Recon-
ceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 983 (1993); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and
Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11 (1994); Bruce
C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belong-
ing, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1; Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A
Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986); Ferdi-
nand Schoeman, Childhood Competence and Autonomy, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 267
(1983); NeQl S. Binder, Note, Taking Relationships Seriously: Children, Auton-
omy, and the Right to a Relationship, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1150 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913) (classifying
four kinds of interests and counter-interests: (1) right/duty; (2) privilegeno-
right; (3) power/liability; and (4) immunity/disability).
4. See Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 55.
5. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
AND THE CONSTrrUTION 94 (1989) ("Voting is the preeminent symbol of par-
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merely ideological, however; it has practical effects as well. For
example, fifty years ago it was the elderly who were poor and
neglected. Congress effectively raised them out of poverty with a
series of social welfare programs including Social Security and
Medicare.6 When the cost of such entitlements became an issue,
the programs for the elderly emerged nearly unscathed while the
less well-funded programs designed to help poor children were
drastically reduced.
Part of the problem is that children can't vote. Children
cannot be fully valued members of the community who get a fair
share of the pie unless they get a fair share of the political
power. However, political power for children seems impossible
so long as we assume that power requires autonomy and indi-
vidual choice. The solution lies in an old political theory:
REPRESENTATION. Few of us can directly participate in the
political process. Individuals need not participate directly, how-
ever; others can represent their interests.
Currently, children are vastly underrepresented politically.
Although they are counted for the purpose of determining the
number of representatives and constitute twenty-six percent of
an average congressional district,8 they cannot vote, nor can
anyone else vote on their behalf. In this sense, they share the
plight of women before the adoption of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment. Their numbers swell the political power of their commu-
nities, but that political power is not shared by them. Even if we
assume that the parents who reside with them vote in their in-
ticipation in the society as a respected member, and equality in the voting
process is a crucial affirmation of the equal worth of citizens." (footnote omit-
ted)); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (noting that the right to vote "confirms an individual per-
son's membership" in the community); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Token-
ism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89
MICH. L. REv. 1077, 1084-85 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, Tokenism] (calling
voting an "aTmation of self-worth and human dignity").
6. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.CA. § 301 (1994); Medicare Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396 (1994); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, p. 473, tbl.734 (1996); Jona-
than Barry Forman, Reconsidering the Income Tax Treatment of the Elderly:
It's Time for the Elderly To Pay Their Fair Share, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 589,
593-96 (1995).
7. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, ONE IN FOUR:
AMERICA'S YOUNGEST POOR (1996); Lief Jensen et al., Child Poverty and the
Ameliorative Effects of Public Assistance, 74 SOc. SCI. Q., 542, 545 (1993).
8. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION, GENERAL
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 1 (1992) [hereinafter POPULATION CHAR-
ACTERISTICS].
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terest, children continue to be substantially underrepresented.
Parents and the children who live with them comprise over two-
thirds of the people within an average congressional district but
control just over half the votes.9 In contrast, adults not living
with children comprise less than one-third of the people but con-
trol nearly half the votes.'0 Consequently, when the pie is di-
vided, children are dramatically underrepresented in the politi-
cal process. Children, as citizens and members of the polity,
need the protection afforded by the right to vote even if they are
not capable of exercising it directly.
PEOPLE IN A CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Minor Children 148,841 Combined
Parents w/ Children 228,986 377,827
Other Adults 194,639
Total 572,466
VOTES IN A CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
228,986 Parents with Children
194,639 Other Adults
423,625 Total Votes
Parents and Children: 66% of the people
54% of the voters
Other Adults: 34% of the people
46% of the voters
Part I of this article critiques autonomy as a source of
rights on two grounds: its failure to account for power differ-
ences and its emphasis on individual rather than communal
rights and duties. Part II documents how the notion of auton-
omy historically has been used to reserve the right to vote for
insiders, as seen particularly in the struggles of African-
9. See id. at 2, 49; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION BASE FOR AP-
PORTIONMENT AND THE NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES APPORTIONED: 1790 TO
1990 tbtB (last modified July 15, 1997) http'//www.census.gov/population
/www/censusdata/apportionment.htbnl> [hereinafter APPORTIONMENT].
10. See POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 8, at 2, 49; APPOR-
TIONMENT, supra note 9, at tbl.B.
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Americans, women, and the poor to secure the right to vote.
Part III critiques two proposed methods of improving children's
welfare, namely increased autonomy rights and substantive
entitlement programs. It also discusses the impact of exclud-
ing children from politics. Finally, Part IV suggests a new the-
ory of representation that could grant children indirect access
to the political process.
I. AUTONOMY AS A SOURCE OF RIGHTS
One of the central problems of liberal democratic theory is
that rights are derived from autonomy. For our purposes,
autonomy may be defined as "people's capacity to decide for
themselves some of the ways they will or will not enter into re-
lationships with others."' Liberal philosophers were frustrated
with the perceived injustices of monarchy, so they posited that
legitimate government could arise only from the consent of the
governed.' 2 That consent was expressed in a social contract be-
tween autonomous equals. Autonomy was crucial to such a social
contract in two distinct ways. First, the social contract pre-
sumed that individuals were free to leave if they were unwilling
to surrender some of their liberty for the security government of-
fered. 3 The "love it or leave it" philosophy assumed that indi-
viduals either could move their entire families with them, or
that they would have no responsibilities to the families left be-
hind. Thus, the individuals had to be both self-sufficient and
unhindered by claims of family or community. 4 Second, indi-
viduals had to consent both to be governed and to participate in
self-government. 5 Because those who entered the social contract
were vested with certain rights and duties, only mature and ra-
tional individuals could be capable of giving informed consent.
Therefore, in traditional liberal theory, rights were granted to
11. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990) [hereinafter NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY].
12. See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, Two
TREATISES]; THE FEDERALIST NOS. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), 2 (John Jay).
13. See LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 12, at 164-65.
14. A less literal reading of the social contract might see it as simply re-
quiring citizens to accept as a quid pro quo that rights carry corresponding
duties to the polity. Even in this theoretical sense, individuals had to be self-
sufficient to be able to perform the duties demanded.
15. See LOCKE, Two TREATISES, supra note 12, at 164-65.
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individuals who possessed three key attributes: (1) they were
self-sufficient; (2) they were individualistic; and (3) they were
rational.
The liberal emphasis on autonomy has been critiqued from
several different perspectives."6 For the purpose of exploring
how liberal theory affects children, two particular critiques
emerge. First, a power-based critique attacks the failure of liberal
theory to account for power differences. Second, a communitarian
critique questions the emphasis on individual, as opposed to
communal, rights and duties.
A. A POWER-BASED CRrIQUE
Ironically, liberal theory creates rights to protect the power-
ful but leaves few protections for the vulnerable. If only fully in-
dependent, rational individuals possess rights, those who can't
make decisions for themselves have few rights. Consequently,
children get fewer rights to protect their diminished capacity.'7
16. Realists have argued that autonomy fails to describe the actual con-
dition of individuals. See, e.g., James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Post
Modern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 489, 511-13 (1991);
Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 30; Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice:
The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and
Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985).
Feminists have criticized liberal autonomy for failing to account for
women's interests in relationships. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex
and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 967 (1984); Minow, supra note 2,
at 17; Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497,
1505 (1983); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 582-84 (1986).
Finally, critical race theorists focus on the way liberal autonomy perpetu-
ates racial inequality. See, e.g., Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1356-66 (1988); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Re-
sponse to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320, 2378 (1989); Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and
the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 63, 79 (1993); cf. Pat-
ricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Op-
portunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2134 (1989).
17. Although some constitutional rights have been extended to juveniles,
see, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (extending the right to notice, counsel,
confrontation, cross-examination and the privilege against self-incrimination
to juveniles), children generally have diminished rights. See generally, e.g.,
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding a parental notification re-
quirement before adolescents can have an abortion); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584 (1979) (permitting children to be committed to mental institutions with-
out the same procedural protections as adults); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971) (denying children accused of crimes the right to trial by
1468 [Vol. 82:1463
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One of the founding fathers of liberalism, John Locke, rec-
ognized that children posed particular problems for liberal po-
litical philosophy. 8 In order to justify his view of liberty as in-
herent in the human condition, Locke argued that humans were
born both free and rational;'9 however, Locke also wanted to
preserve the nearly absolute dominion of parents over their chil-
dren. 0 He therefore maintained that children were subject to
parental control because they lacked the ability to reason that
would develop with age. Liberty inhered in the human condition
because of the inborn capacity to develop reason, but full liberty
did not arise until reason was fully developed at adulthood. By
expressly connecting liberty to rationality, Locke laid the foun-
dation for limiting the rights of the most vulnerable citizens.2'
Early liberals were aware of the problems faced by the rela-
tively powerless. Both John Stuart Mill and James Madison
recognized the danger inherent in the "tyranny of the majority"2
and the control of powerful factions. Perhaps because liberal-
ism arose as a critique of monarchy, 4 however, thinkers like
James Madison were primarily concerned with limiting govern-
jury); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (holding that "[tlhe
state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of
adults."); Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (denying the
right to marry to adolescents). Similarly, contrast Chandler v. Miller, 65
U.S.L.W. 4243 (1997) (holding that candidates for state office could not be re-
quired to submit to drug testing), with Vernonia School District v. Acton, 115
S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (holding that junior high student athletes could be required
to submit to drug testing).
18. See LOCKE, Two TREATISES, supra note 12, at 34-45.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. When rights are based on autonomy, any group labeled as incapable
receives diminished rights. See generally Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights:
An Essay For Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1868-71 (1987) (describing
diminished rights for children); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Fam-
ily Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1174-80 (noting that an individualistic ap-
proach to family law has tended to subordinate wives and children); Boris
Feldman, Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644,
1645-47 (1979) (noting widespread disenfranchisement of mentally disabled
persons).
22. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 89 (A.D. Lindsey ed., Dutton 1951) (1859) (describing "tyranny
of the majority" as a "social tyranny" that "enslav[es] the soul").
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (denouncing the de-
structive power of factions).
24. See LOCKE, Two TREATISES, supra note 12, at 164-65 (criticizing the
foundation of Sir Robert Filmer's absolute monarchy argument by rejecting
the notion that "men are not naturally free" and favoring governance by the
"consent of men").
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ment power. Although Madison worried about private factions
seizing control of government for selfish purposes, he did not
create rights to balance power among individuals in the private
sector.2 As a result, government was not structured to protect
the relatively powerless. 6 Instead, rights were designed to pro-
tect people from the government, not from other individuals or
groups.21 Although the reconstruction amendments later tried to
balance power and equalize the protection provided by govern-
ment, these amendments have not been construed to create af-
firmative rights that the government must protect.2 In essence,
liberalism assumes that limiting government power enables in-
25. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Feminists criticize the
dichotomy between the private sector and the public sector, noting that it has
been used to excuse the subordination of women. See generally, e.g., June
Carbone, Morality, Public Policy and the Family: The Role of Marriage and
the Public/Private Divide, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 267 (1996); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED 93-99 (1987); Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Cri-
tiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 319 (1993); O1-
sen, supra note 16, at 1501-07.
26. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIc INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (Forrest McDonald ed., Free Press
1986) (1913) (suggesting that the constitution constructed the government so
as "to break the force of majority rule and prevent invasions of the property
rights of minorities"); NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 11, at 1
(arguing that the government was designed to protect elites and their private
property); Richard Hofstadter, The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism, in
THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 62-63 (Robert H.
Horwitz ed., 3d ed. 1986) (arguing that the framers were an upper-class elite
who tried to provide some limited voice for the masses); Jane Rutherford,
Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Em-
ployment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1061-62
(1996) (arguing that the constitution created a republican form of government
to favor rule by elites, but that there was a limited form of equality also in-
corporated into the structure of government).
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (arguing that factions
are most dangerous when they comprise the majority and are able to use gov-
ernment power to oppress the minority).
28. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Serv., 489
U.S. 189 (1989). But see JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 177 (1951) ("The equal protection of the laws
is thus a command for the fll or ample protection of the laws. It is basically
an affirmative command to supply the protection of the laws."); Susan Ban-
des, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2344-47
(1990) (arguing that the constitution should be read to create affirmative
rights of protection); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886-90 (1986) (comparing our Constitution
with Germany's to suggest that our courts, like theirs, can find positive con-
stitutional rights).
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dividuals to fight out their differences among themselves.29 That
approach ignores power imbalances and consequently abandons
those who are less capable of fighting for themselves.
Children, who lack both autonomy and power, are the losers
in this version of liberalism. As a class, children range from in-
fants who are completely dependent on others to seventeen-year-
olds who are on the verge of maturity. Throughout this range,
children lack legal autonomy to make their own decisions. Al-
though a few exceptions are emerging for mature minors making
health care decisions and children who are tried as adults for
some crimes,31 the general rule is that minors may not contract
and are not held responsible for their actions on the same terms
as adults?2 Indeed, there are sound arguments for treating chil-
dren and adolescents differently from adults.33 At some ages
children arguably lack the cognitive capacity to reason,3 4 the
emotional maturity to exercise sound judgment,35 the experience
necessary to weigh likely consequences,36 and the bargaining
29. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (suggesting that a mul-
tiplicity of factions will guard against any particular one seizing control).
30. See Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 127, 131 (1996) [hereinafter Oberman, Minor Rights] (critiquing the
mature minor doctrine as applied to health care decisions).
31. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-4 (1995).
32. See, e.g., DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 105-106 (2d
ed. 1997).
33. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Deci-
sionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1607 (1992).
34. See, e.g., Jean Piaget, Intellectual Evolution from Adolescence to
Adulthood, 15 HuMAN DEv. 1, 9-10 (1972) (discussing evidence that some
skills do not develop until between the ages of 15-20, and then may be attrib-
utable to specialized training). See generally BARBEL INHELDER & JEAN
PIAGET, THE EARLY GROWTH OF LOGIC IN THE CHILD (1964) [hereinafter
PIAGET, LOGIC]; JEAN PIAGET, THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN
(1952).
35. "[Aldolescents are in an odd position of appearing as adults but not
having the developmental maturity to cope with adultlike expectations."
Maryse Richards & Anne C. Petersen, Biological Theoretical Models of Ado-
lescent Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 48 (Vincent B.
Van Hasselt & Michel Hersen eds., 1987). This difference rests on actual
brain development. The prefrontal lobe of the brain does not develop fully
mature electrophysiological activity until early adulthood. This portion of the
brain is believed to control the "executive function" that enables individuals to
"have adequate perspective in order to plan successfully and to anticipate the
outcome of one's behavior." Sidney J. Segalowitz et al., Cleverness and Wis-
dom in 12-Year-Olds: Electrophysiological Evidence for Late Maturation of the
Frontal Lobe, 8 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 279 (1992).
36. See Ann Palmeri, Childhood's End: Toward the Liberation of Chil-
dren, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND
14711998]
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power to protect themselves from overreaching adults. Even
seventeen-year-olds on the cusp of maturity lack the bargaining
power of adults, in part because of legal restrictions on their ca-
pacity, and in part because of a lack of financial opportunities.
Teens routinely are limited in their capacity to hold jobs and suf-
fer from unemployment at levels nearly three times that of
adults.37 Because children and adolescents lack financial re-
sources, their choices are quite limited. Both descriptively and
legally children of all ages lack meaningful autonomy.
Without autonomy, they acquire few rights. Consequently,
children have no right to exercise political power to protect their
interests. Children and adolescents are completely disenfran-
chised. Although it is difficult to measure how much disenfran-
chisement costs them, statistics support the hypothesis that
children do not fare well in society. Children comprise the largest
segment of our poor citizens;38 over one-fifth of them were living
in poverty in 1994.39 Unfortunately, the very youngest are the
worst off: over twenty-five percent of children under age six were
poor in 1994.40 The declining welfare of children in the United
States has been well documented.4  Whatever increases in
autonomy our children have gained, their welfare has not im-
proved. With the passage of welfare reform, many experts pre-
STATE POWER 105, 114-17 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980);
Richards & Petersen, supra note 35, at 48 ("Young people experience pressure
to behave the way adults do-in both the healthy and unhealthy ways-but
usually lack the experience that facilitates the development of healthy, ma-
ture behavior.").
37. In 1995, teens experienced a 17.3% unemployment rate compared to a
national average for 5.6% for individuals over the age of twenty. See STAFF
OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 104TH CONG., 2ND SESS., 1996
GREEN Booyc BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS 1164 tbl.F-3 (Comm. Print
1996) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK].
38. See id. at 1223 tbl.H-1.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 1218 tbl.G-36.
41. For an analysis of the variety of ways in which the welfare of children
is declining, see Jane Maslow Cohen, Competitive and Cooperative Dependen-
cies: The Case for Children, 81 VA. L. REV. 2217, 2231-35 (1995). See gener-
ally W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: HOW
AMERICANS FAIL THEIR CHILDREN (Univ. of Chicago Press 1988) (1982);
SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: THE COST OF NEGLECTING
OUR CHILDREN (1991); VIVAN A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD:
THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985); Victor R. Fuchs & Diane
M. Reklis, America's Children: Economic Perspectives and Policy Options, 255
SCIENCE 41 (1992).
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dict that the welfare of the nation's poorest children will decline
even further.4 2
Although few would dispute the declining welfare of chil-
dren, some might be skeptical as to the causes. For instance, the
growing impoverishment of children might be explained by the
increasing numbers of children living in single-parent house-
holds. In 1994, 47.2% of the children living in female-headed
households lived in poverty.43 However, it is legislatures that
decide how to respond to such social conditions. Whatever the
cause of child poverty, the legislatures have not leapt to the pro-
tection of children. At one point in our history, the elderly were
vastly overrepresented in the poor population. The response of
the New Deal and the Great Society was to pass Social Security
and Medicare legislation to decrease the number of aged poor.
Faced with a comparable crisis for children, Congress has re-
sponded with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, which decreases support to the poor-
est members of society: children dependent on single parents,
typically mothers.45
Why is there such a disparity in how legislatures treat the
elderly and children? One explanation recurs: the elderly vote in
disproportionately high numbers and comprise one of the nation's
largest and most powerful lobbying groups.' In contrast, chil-
42. See, e.g., Testimony of David T. Ellwood before the Senate Finance
Committee Regarding Welfare Reform; Edelman Decries President's Betrayal
of Promise "Not to Hurt Children"; Calls Spurious Welfare Legislation a
Moral Blot on Nation, PR NEWSWIRE, July 31, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File (noting Marian Wright Edelman's prediction that
welfare reform would "make more than one million additional children poor").
In 1997, only half of the parents who left the welfare rolls were able to findjobs. See Jason DeParle, Welfare Reform Nets Real Change: Big Drop in
Caseloads Reported, N.Y. TIMES, reprinted in DENV. POST, Jan. 14, 1998, at
A-21.
43. GREEN BOOK, supra note 37, at 1223.
44. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1994); Medicare Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1396 (1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 615 (1935), reprinted in
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: INCOME SECURITY 145, 146-7(Robert B. Stevens ed., 1970) (acknowledging the economic predicament of the
elderly and proposing an old age pension plan, with federal matching funds);
S.R. REP. No. 1513 (1964), reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra, at 711 (noting that older people need insurance protection
against the "crushing burden of hospital costs" and calling for federally sub-
sidized medical expenses).
45. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1996).
46. See Lynne M. Casper, Projections of the Voting-Age Population for
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dren cannot vote and are incapable of organizing themselves into
an effective lobby.47
B. A COMMUNAAN CRITIQUE
Communitarians criticize liberal theory for focusing on in-
dividuals." Liberal political theory inaccurately sees people as
isolated individuals without connections to other groups like
families and religious organizations. Concentrating on individual
rights places both the individual and the community at risk.
Individuals are harmed in two ways. First, the failure to impose
duties on the community fails to protect the vulnerable. Second,
the community is not held accountable for its role in shaping
individuals.
Individuals, especially children, are endangered by a theory
that presumes they are completely self-sufficient. Children then
have no right to demand any support from the community. For
example, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a right for
children to be educated,49 to be fed or sheltered,50 or to be pro-
tected from violence and abuse.5'
States: November 1994, in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, NO. 453 (1994); Voting and
Registration in the Election of November 1990, in supra (1994) (reporting that
approximately 60% of the elderly vote); Albert B. Crenshaw, Assessing the Po-
litical Power of Seniors: Although Still Strong, the Elderly and Their Groups
Are Increasingly on the Defensive, WASH. POST, April 29, 1992, at R4 (noting
that the American Association of Retired People had a membership of 33 mil-
lion and annual revenues of $300 million in 1992).
47. For a discussion of the relationship between elderly voting power and
children, see, for example, Cohen, supra note 41, at 2243-45; Paul E. Peterson,
An Immodest Proposal, 121 DAEDALUS 151, 170 (1992).
48. For a fuller discussion of communitarian critiques of liberal doctrine,
see generally AMATAI ETIONI, THE SPIRT OF COMUNITY: THE REINVENTION
OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALM THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOuRSE (1991); HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDwVIDUALISM AND COMMrMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 142-63 (Robert N. Bellah
et al. eds., 1985); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE (1982); Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self,
30 REPRESENTATIONS 162, 163 (1990). For a more specific communitarian
critique in the context of families, see Hafen, supra note 2; Jane Rutherford,
The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (1992) (suggesting that
many rights can be exercised only in the context of the family).
49. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37(1973) (holding that there is no fundamental right to education). Although
the Court has held that states cannot exclude the children of undocumented
aliens from public schools, that decision rests on antidiscriminatory principles
rather than a substantive right to education. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982).
50. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (rejecting a claim to
1474 [Vol. 82:1463
ONE CHILD, ONE VOTE
Parents are supposed to supply these essentials. Rights
theoretically carry corresponding duties, and the right to procre-
ate justifies the duty to support one's children. However, the
strong emphasis on individual freedom encourages individuals
to advance their own personal interests and to minimize, if not
discard, their duties. The difficulty in collecting child support
payments illustrates the point. Students in my family law class
often suggest that it should be considered unconstitutional to
impose a duty to support a child if the father has requested an
abortion. Their reasoning follows traditional liberal contractar-
ian lines: no duties may be imposed without consent; a father
who wanted the fetus aborted did not consent to the birth; hence,
no duty to pay child support should arise. Some students even
go so far as to argue that enforcing child support amounts to in-
voluntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment. Although
courts have resisted these arguments, the students' reasoning is
consistent with liberal theory that views rights and duties as
arising from consensual contracts.
The classic liberal response is to shift the consent phase of
the contract back one step to the point of conception. By con-
senting to sex, men agree to abide by the duty to support any
children that may result. Although this approach may impose
an individual duty on parents to support their own children, it
fails to provide much of a safety net for impoverished children.
Those who acquire the duty to support children do not necessar-
ily have the financial capacity to do so. Children have no right
to be fed, educated, or nurtured; rather, individual parents have
duties. If those parents are unable to perform their duties, chil-
dren have no claims against the community. Thus, individual
rights and duties fail to protect vulnerable children. Only more
communal responsibility for children will assure that all chil-
dren's needs will be met.
Concentrating on individual rights also assumes far greater
autonomy than actually exists. Individuals, especially children,
are shaped and influenced by others, but only individuals are ac-
countable for the resulting behavior.52 Children are endangered
shelter as a fundamental interest); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483
(1970) (holding that it was constitutional to limit the amount of welfare re-
ceived by poor families regardless of family size).
51. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189,
201 (1989) (holding that children did not have a fundamental right to have the
state protect them from life-threatening child abuse, even when the state had
knowledge of the threat).
52. See SANDEL, supra note 48, at 175-83 (arguing that real people are
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when the community escapes responsibility for its role in molding
children's behavior. The result is a peculiar kind of scapegoating
where we punish children without changing the structures that
induced them to misbehave. Gangs illustrate the point. One of
my students described how her eight-year-old nephew had been
intimidated with physical threats to pressure him to join a gang.
When the child's parents complained to the police, they were
told that the child should simply refuse to join the gang. That
response left the child both unprotected from violent assault and
distrustful of the police. Children are often pressured to join a
gang for self-protection from other gangs, for social interaction,
and by blackmail.53 Once in a gang, escape is difficult, if not im-
possible, until the child grows old enough to move away. Con-
sider the case of "Yummy" Sandifer.54 At the age of eleven,
Yummy killed a girl in a muffed gang shooting. In retaliation,
the gang executed Yummy. Trapped in a gang culture, this child
had few options. The state's response was to prosecute the
youths who shot Yummy. Each of these children, however, was
both a victim and a perpetrator of the gang culture.55 Holding
them individually liable for their actions without dismantling
the social structure that contributed to their behavior is ineffec-
tive. We, as a community, have a duty to protect our children
from gang recruitment. The focus on individual rights and re-
sponsibilities fails to hold the relevant groups accountable for
their roles in shaping the lives of these children.
The community as a whole suffers from this intense focus on
individual rights as well. Two related harms occur. First, when
necessarily constrained by the formative influences of family and religion).
53. For an explanation of why children join gangs for protection and why
they subsequently commit crimes out of a sense of obligation and a fear of
painful or fatal chastisement, see generally David S. Rutkowski, Note, A Co-
ercion Defense for the Street Gang Criminal: Plugging the Moral Gap in Exist-
ing Law, 10 NOTRE DAME L.J. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 137, 142-165 (1996). See
also Frank E. Harper, To Kill the Messenger: The Deflection of Responsibility
Through Scapegoating (A Socio-Legal Analysis of Parental Responsibility
Laws and the Urban Gang Family), 8 HARv. BLACKLETTER J. 41, 50 (1991)
(explaining that youths join gangs for protection).
54. For a description of this case, see James Hill, 2nd Brother Gets Prison
Term For Murder of Sandifer, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 23, 1997, (Metro), at 1; George
Papajohn, Robert: Executed At 11; A Sad Life; 'Sick" Child Saw Life As 'Serin'
Time', CHI. TRMB., Sept. 2, 1994, at 1; Maurice Possley, Slain Boy's Troubled
Life Revealed in Scars, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 31, 1996, (Metro), at 1.
55. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence,
83 VA. L. REV. 349, 357 (1997) (discussing gangs and peer influence on the
decision to commit crimes); see also Harper, supra note 53, at 50; Rutkowski,
supra note 53, at 155-65.
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individuals seek their own personal benefit at the expense of
others, the common good may be diminished. Second, concen-
trating on individuals creates a discourse of rights that tends to
skew priorities. Interests that get labeled "rights" tend to be
privileged over competing interests. The debate over funding
public education illustrates both communal harms. As a nation,
we all benefit from a well-educated populace both to sustain an
educated electorate, and to support the economy. The more
people who are capable of holding self-sustaining employment,
the better off we all are 6 Accordingly, the best strategy would
seem to be investing in widespread, high-quality education for
all children. However, individuals have a competitive edge if
they can acquire a better education than their peers. This focus
on individual gain, as opposed to the common good, has induced
most states to fund public schools not with equitable grants from
general state revenues, but with local property taxes that dis-
proportionately benefit wealthy students and penalize the poor. 7
56. Arguably elites might benefit from having a marginally employable
class to keep wage costs down, creating what Marx would call "the reserve
army of the unemployed." Indeed, the now outdated Phillips curve predicted
that low unemployment creates inflation. See, e.g., A.W. Phillips, The Rela-
tion Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in
the United Kingdom, 1861-1957, 25 ECONOMICA 283 (1958). Both the experi-
ence of high inflation coupled with high unemployment in the 1970s, and the
current experience with low inflation and low unemployment have caused
economists to rethink the Phillips curve. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, UN-
EMPLOYMENT VERSUS INFLATION? AN EVALUATION OF THE PHILLIPS CURVE
(1975); James K Galbraith, The Surrender of Economic Policy, AM.
PROSPECT, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 60-67. Even if we accept that some unemploy-
ment is inevitable in a modern economy, however, there are strong reasons
why the unemployed should also be well educated. First it would be prefer-
able to rotate the unemployed rather keeping a permanent underclass. In or-
der to step into the market, the unemployed need to be educated. Second, the
unemployed, just like those who work, need to be well educated to be good po-
litical citizens.
57. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., 1996 DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 151 (1996) (showing that local
funds accounted for 47.8% of public schools' funds for the 1993-94 school
year); id. at 152 (revealing that the range in states' reliance on local funds for
schools is .8% in Hawaii to 86.2% in New Hampshire); David Dormont, Sepa-
rate and Unequal: School District Financing, 11 LAW & INEQ. J. 261, 271-72
(1992) (stating that 90% of all local funding for schools comes from property
taxes). The variation between districts can be substantial. For example, in
Illinois the average amount of money spent per student per year ranged from
$2,617 in one district to $14,525 in another. See Rick Pearson, Court Takes
Pass on School Funding, CH. TRIB., October 19, 1996, § 1, at 1. Although
some state courts have invalidated such differences on state constitutional
grounds, at least nineteen states have rejected such challenges. See David J.
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The Supreme Court rejected a challenge to this system, noting
that there was no fundamental right to an education.58 In the
absence of such a right, the states were free to privilege wealthier
students at the expense of both the community and the poorer
students. Thus, the focus on individual rights harms the com-
munity by devaluing the common good and creating an inflexible
hierarchy of rights.
Although the liberal emphasis on individual rights has
harmed children both individually and communally, communi-
tarian solutions that vest more power in the family or the state
may also put children at risk. When communities are given
more power to seek the common good, they may be tempted to
sacrifice their least powerful members to do so. The classic ex-
ample from literature is Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter,
Iphigenia, to the gods in order change the weather so his fleet
could sail to fight the Trojans.59 All too often, it is children who
are sacrificed for the interests of adults who can vote. Further-
more, communities differ over what constitutes the common
good and what constitutes sacrifice. Consider, for example, the
case of secondary education for Amish children. Although the
Amish community may be better off educating its children in the
traditional ways of agriculture and religion, the larger polity
may be better off educating as many children as possible to com-
pete in a global technological market. The next Amish child may
be the next Einstein. As the Amish example suggests, even if we
give preference to the common good, we must decide which
community is to be benefited. Most of us are members of multi-
ple communities that have differing goals and perspectives.
Sheikh, Public School Finance Reform: Is Illinois 'Playing Hooky"?, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 195 (1991).
58. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37
(1973).
59. See Euripides, Iphigenia in Tauris, in THREE PLAYS: HIPPOLyTUS,
ALCESTIS 73-119 (Philip Vellacott trans., Penguin Books 1953). Indeed,
daughter sacrifice is a common theme across cultures. The Bible tells the
story of Jeptha's daughter who, like Iphigenia, is sacrificed to win a battle. In
that story we are not even told her name, only that she is a virgin. See
Judges 11:29-40. Similarly, several ancient religious cultures sacrificed vir-
ginal young women. See John Noble Wilford, New Analysis of the Parthenon's
Frieze Finds It Depicts a Horrifying Legend, N.Y. TIMEs, July 4, 1995, § 1, at
11. Occasionally, the human sacrifice is a son, as in the story of Abraham and
Isaac. See Genesis 22:1-19. There, however, God relents and spares the boy.
Powerful adult males are almost never sacrificed except as soldiers in battle.
See id. at 22:20. Even then, the long tradition has been to use young men and
boys. See Wilford, supra, at 11.
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Merely pursuing the common good does not help us prioritize the
needs of children.
Some communitarians take the criticism even further and
question the entire value of rights." They argue that because
rights create vested interests, rights all too often represent the
end of discourse about how competing claims should be handled.
Hence, there should be no rights, merely an ongoing negotiation
among members of the community."1
The problem with this view is that it ignores power imbal-
ances just as much as classic liberal theory does. When indi-
viduals or groups are relatively powerless within their commu-
nities, they are unlikely to be heard in the ongoing discourse.
For them, only rights entitle them to be heard and to have a fair
share of influence. Their rights must be enforceable against
more powerful individuals or groups that would shut them out.
The right to vote is a classic example. It entitles the otherwise
disenfrachised to engage in the discussion. The less power a
segment of the population has, the more it needs rights or enti-
tlements to protect it from the larger group.
Children need to be considered both as individuals and as
members of various communities in order to meet their needs.
Voting is the mechanism for resolving competing needs in a de-
mocracy. That tool is not available to children.
H. PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE FOR INSIDERS BY
FOCUSING ON THE INCAPACITY OF OUTSIDERS
Nevertheless, it seems to make sense to limit the right to
vote to those who are capable of exercising it. In fact, Locke was
quite specific in tracing liberty to the ability to reason.62 Unfor-
tunately, this emphasis on capacity to vote has a long and sordid
history as a pretext for subordinating unpopular groups. The
worst taint arose in the context of slavery; enslaved blacks and
free African-Americans had to be characterized as intellectually
inferior to justify denying them liberties, including the right to
vote. In order to enforce this image of ignorance, African-
60. See generally, e.g., ETIONI, supra note 48, at 4-11 (suggesting a
moratorium on creating new rights and imposing duties without correspond-
ing rights); GLENDON, supra note 48; HABMTS OF THE HEART, supra note 48;
Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 27 (1992).
61. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 48, at 182.
62. See LOCKE, Two TREATISES, supra note 12, at 129.
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Americans were often legally barred from receiving an educa-
tion.
Prior to the Civil War, most states directly prohibited blacks
from voting.63 Excluding slaves and former slaves from the vote
complicated the system of representation, however. The federal
government was faced with the question whether individuals
who couldn't vote should be counted to determine the number of
representatives a state had in Congress. Abolitionists and the
free states did not want to increase the power of the slave states
by counting African-Americans. Southern states wanted to
count all residents. The compromise was to count each non-
voter as three-fifths of a person." Ironically, the effort to dimin-
ish southern power resulted in further subordination of African-
Americans. An enslaved African-American was legally labeled
not only as incapable of voting, but also as less than a full person.
Further, the compromise had more than merely symbolic value.
Because the slave states were permitted to partially count the
enslaved, these states received more political power in Congress.
Framing the right to vote in terms of capacity encouraged slave
states to brand African-Americans as inferior and then rewarded
these states with additional political power for doing so.
The most blatant attempt to enforce the stereotype of inca-
pacity was a series of statutes that prohibited teaching blacks to
read.65 Even when schools were finally opened to African-
Americans, they seldom were adequately funded or able to pro-
vide an education equivalent to that offered to white students."
Literacy tests then supplanted direct prohibition as a means of
restricting access to the ballot;67 often these were administered
63. Only Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Vermont permitted African-Americans to vote on the same terms as whites.
See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 156 (1970). In New York blacks, unlike
whites, were permitted to vote only if they owned property. See id.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
65. See, e.g., 1823 Miss. Laws, ch. XI, at 62-63; 1847 Mo. Laws, §§ 1-2, at
103-04.
66. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950) (describing differ-
ences between African-American and white law schools in Texas and holding
that petitioner could not be excluded from the white University of Texas Law
School on the basis of race). See generally Robin D. Barnes, Black America
and School Choice: Charting A New Course, 106 YALE L.J. 2375 (1997).
67. See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE
QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 8-9 (1992) (describing how southern states used
literacy tests and discretionary application of them to exclude minority vot-
ers); FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERIcANs DON'T
VOTE (1988) (suggesting that literacy tests, poll taxes, and limits on registra-
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unfairly to ensure that African-Americans could not pass. 8 Con-
sequently, slaves and former slaves were labeled intellectually
inferior, and the label was then legally enforced. Disenfran-
chisement was a tool to keep African-Americans subordinated,
so even after the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, attempts
were made to keep blacks from voting. Those who vote are full
and equal members of the community, and excluding individuals
from political participation is a powerful tool to stigmatize
them.69
Stigmatizing groups is a common part of subordinating
them, but even positive stereotypes can be damaging. Some-
times groups are simultaneously stigmatized and idealized.70
For example, women in the nineteenth century were character-
ized as morally inferior,71 emotional,72 irrational, delicate,73 pas-
tion were designed to exclude African-Americans from the ballot); see also
Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (holding that North
Carolina's attempt to resurrect the use of literacy tests as a voter qualification
was used as a mechanism to deny or abridge the right of African-Americans to
vote, given the dual school system and the inferior education that North
Carolina provided to African-Americans); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (1915) (striking down Oklahoma's "grandfather clause" that applied liter-
acy tests only to those whose ancestors were citizens and allowed to vote in
1866).
68. See Literacy Tests and Voter Requirements in Federal and State Elec-
tions: Hearings on S. 480, S. 2750 and S. 2979 Before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 672 (1962) (1959
Report by U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: Proposal for a Constitutional
Amendment to Establish Universal Suffrage) ("In its investigations, hearings,
and studies the Commission has seen that complex voter qualification laws,
including tests of literacy, education, and interpretation,' have been used and
may readily be used arbitrarily to deny the right to vote to citizens of the
United States.").
69. For example, Burke noted that Catholics were really only "half citi-
zens" so long as they were denied suffrage. BURKE's POLITICS: SELECTED
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BuiRE ON REFORM, REVOLUTION, AND
WAR 509 (Ross J.S. Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1959); see also JUDITH N.
SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIp: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 27 (1991)
('Without the right [to vote] one was less than a citizen."); James A. Gardner,
Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A
Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893 (1997) (arguing
that a full vote is a measure of full citizenship).
70. For example, Chinese and Japanese immigrants were stereotyped
both positively and negatively in ways that contributed to subordination. See
generally, e.g., Sumi K Cho, Model Minority Mythology and Affirmative Ac-
tion-Supreme Stereotypes of Asian Americans (Aug. 21, 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author); Natsu Taylor Saito, Model Minority, Yellow
Peril: Functions of 'Foreignness" in the Construction of Asian American Legal
Identity, 4 ASIAN L.J. 71 (1997); Frank H. Wu, Changing America: Three Ar-
guments About Asian Americans and the Law, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 811 (1996).
71. For example, Rousseau argued that women were morally inferior, in-
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sive,74 simple-minded, weak,75 timid,76 and child-like,7 and these
stereotypes reinforced the opposition to sufflrage 8 Even those
who placed women on a pedestal did so to create a separate pri-
vate sphere outside of politics: women were simply too sweet,
naive, and sentimental to vote. Participating in politics would
corrupt them, the argument went. Thus women were denied the
vote both because they were deemed inferior to men, and because
they occupied a special role in the home. However, the generali-
zations about women as pure, kind, honest, and noble allowed
capable of controlling their sexual desires and, therefore, a threat to political
society, which must be conducted solely by men, outside the influence of
women who would weaken them. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE OR ON
EDUCATION 360 (1979); see also HORACE BUSHNELL, WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE:
REFORM AGAINST NATURE 142 (Zenger Pub. Co. 1978) (1869) (arguing that
women should not be granted suffrage because "women often show a strange
facility of debasement and moral abandonment .... Men go down by a de-
scent.., women, by a precipitation.").
72. See BUSHNELL, supra note 71, at 139-40 (referring to women as excit-
able, excessive, and uncontrollable and discussing how overheated they would
be if they were granted the vote).
73. See JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF
U.S. WOMEN 61 (1991) (quoting a letter John Adams wrote to a friend on May
26, 1776, noting that women were too delicate for experience in business and
politics and that they needed to devote their attention to their children);
BUSHNELL, supra note 71, at 138, 167.
74. See HOFF, supra note 73, at 101 (quoting an article in the October 18,
1802 edition of the True American suggesting that women merely v9ted as
their male relatives suggested, giving disproportionate political power to men
with female relatives); see also BUSHNELL, supra note 71, at 21 (suggesting
that women lack authority).
75. See Jacob Katz Cogan, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and Suf-
frage in Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 473, 486 (1997) (quoting
the statements made by John R. Cooke at the Virginia Constitutional Con-
vention of 1829-30).
76. See id.
77. Several commentators have documented the tendency to characterize
women as childlike, both in legal and social contexts. See, e.g., Catharine Al-
biston, The Social Meaning of the Norplant Condition: Constitutional Consid-
erations of Race, Class, and Gender, 2 CARDOzO WOMEN'S L.J. 109, 112
(1994); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV.
803, 813-14 (1990); Sarah A. DeCosse, Simply Unbelievable: Reasonable
Women and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 10 L. & INEQ. J. 285,
305 (1992); Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and Image: Adver-
tising as an Antitrust Issue, 1990 DUKE L.J. 321, 363.
78. See SARA HUNTER GRAHAM, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE NEW
DEMOCRACY 21 (1996) (describing antisuffragists who depicted women as
"undependable, impulsive, and easily corruptible). See generally BUSHNELL,
supra note 71 (arguing that women should not vote because it was against
their nature); Cogan, supra note 75, at 486-90 (documenting the way women's
role in the separate family sphere was used to defeat woman suffrage in the
nineteenth century).
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suffragettes to argue that women would clean up the sordid
world of politics.79 Eventually these positive stereotypes enabled
women to prevail, and the vote, which had been formally ex-
tended to African-American men in 1870,80 was extended to
women in 1920.81
This piecemeal approach to suffrage illustrates an irony of
our democracy: we have never established a right to vote for all.82
Historically, we have conferred the right to vote on a select
group, purposely excluding others.83 Although a few of the colo-
nies initially permitted all males to vote, by the time of the
Revolutionary war, most colonies limited the vote to property-
owning white males." There were two rationales for the prop-
erty requirement: (1) only property holders were independent
enough to resist corruption; and (2) only property holders had a
sufficient stake in the polity to wield their votes responsibly.
Women were precluded from voting because their property was
owned either by their fathers or their husbands; however, no
explanation was offered why adult unmarried women who
owned property could not vote. Gradually, states began elimi-
79. See AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE
MOVEMENT 1890-1920, at 42-74 (1965).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
82. "It has been established in recent years that the Equal Protection
Clause confers the substantive right to participate on an equal basis with
other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an electoral process for
determining who will represent any segment of the State's population ....
But there is no constitutional right to vote, as such.... If there were such a
right, both the Fifteenth Amendment and the Nineteenth Amendment would
have been wholly- unnecessary." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 n.2 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
83. See, e.g., Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946, 963 (D.S.C. 1995)
(describing the history of excluding outsiders from the vote). For particular
explanations of how the denial of suffrage operated to subordinate women, see
generally Joellen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman
Suffrage for the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1994); Louisa S.
Ruffine, Civil Rights and Suffrage: Myra Bradwell's Struggle for the Equal
Citizenship for Women, 4 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 175 (1993); Jennifer K.
Brown, Note, The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's Equality, 102 YALE
L.J. 2175 (1993).
84. See J. Morgan Kousser, Suffrage, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL HISTORY 1236, 1237 (Jack P. Green ed., 1984) ("Pennsylvania in
1776 and New Hampshire in 1782 went furthest, substituting a taxpaying for
a property qualification. Adult males could satisfy the requirement by paying
a fixed-amount poll or capitation (head) tax. Notorious in the twentieth cen-
tury as a southern suffrage restriction, the poll tax was initially a liberalizing
provision."); see also Cogan, supra note 75, at 473, 476.
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nating the property requirement in the first half of the nine-
teenth century.5 Nevertheless, those who occupied lower status,
such as people of color and women, continued to be disenfran-
chised.
Originally, the women's rights and abolitionist movements
were united in seeking rights for both women and African-
Americans.86 However, these groups were easily divided on sexist
and racist lines once the Republicans drafted the Fifteenth
Amendment to guarantee the vote for black men, but not
women.17 Instead of standing together, some suffragette leaders
made racist arguments that women were more capable of voting
than former slaves and formed alliances with racist Democratic
party leaders who had supported slavery.8 Although some black
leaders like George Downing made sexist claims, others like
Frederick Douglass supported women's suffrage, and wanted to
maintain the coalition between blacks and women. 9 The Re-
publicans who drafted the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments were less concerned with the rights of either blacks or
women than with manipulating the voting rules to assure a Re-
publican majority."
Incremental change was both easier to accomplish and less
threatening, so each small expansion of the franchise was limited
to the particular group that had garnered sufficient political and
moral support to be included. This narrow focus on particular
groups required the same general principle to be reestablished
for each outsider group and fostered infighting among the vary-
ing groups of outsiders.9' This infighting is particularly harmful
85. Cogan, supra note 75, at 477-81.
86. The abolitionist and women's rights movements shared an agenda
from 1848 until the schism over the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869. See
BETINA APTHEKER, WoMAN's LEGACY: ESSAYS ON RACE, SEX, AND CLASS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 11 (1982).
87. See id. at 13 (noting that "unity was effectively broken by the com-
bined impact of racism in the women's movement, racist and male suprema-
cist practices in the abolitionist ranks, and the machinations of Republican
politicians").
88. See id. at 45. Particularly troubling was their alliance with George
Francis Train, a racist populist that helped them in the Kansas campaign for
suffrage. See id. at 43-44; see also ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS
81-82 (1981).
89. See DAVIS, supra note 88, at 77-86.
90. See APTHEKER, supra note 86, at 43-44; DAVIS, supra note 88, at 74-
75.
91. See, e.g., Lind, supra note 83, at 166 ("[If suffragists] had to choose
between votes for Black men and votes for women, [they] would choose the
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for those caught in the intersection among groups. For example,
when the debate about the Fifteenth Amendment was cast as a
conflict between the right of African-American men to vote and
the right of women to vote, African-American women were
placed in an untenable position. Since they were both African-
American and female, this false dichotomy pressured them to
choose between parts of their identity.2
The struggle for enfranchisement was full of racist and sexist
images partly because the vote was assumed to rest on notions of
capacity. If incapacity justifies disenfranchisement, then those
who are politically opposed to expanding the franchise for selfish
political reasons have an incentive to define outsiders as inca-
pable. This focus on capacity obscures more important reasons
for granting the franchise. Outsider groups need the vote in order
to protect themselves from powerful insiders who use govern-
ment power to subordinate them. Thus Frederick Douglass ar-
gued that the plight of blacks was so dire that they had to get
the vote in order to survive the violent rampages and economic
re-creation of slavery by another name. 3 That overwhelming
need justified an incremental approach to the franchise if neces-
sary. In essence, Douglass recognized that the vote is a mecha-
nism to balance power.
latter."); Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice As Struggle, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1331, 1364-65 (1995) ("[Mlost of the prominent pre-war abo-
litionists plac[ed] women's rights on the back burner to avoid complicating
and possibly derailing the right for black suffrage."); Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
Gerrit Smith on Petitions, in ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, SUSAN B. ANTHONY:
CoRREsPONDENcE, WRITINGS, SPEECHES 119-24 (Ellen Carol DuBois ed.,
1981) (protesting the refusal to extend suffrage to women in the reconstruc-
tion amendments with racist language and examples).
92. For a discussion of the problems these false dichotomies cause various
groups, and women of color in particular, see ELIZABETH V. SPELLMAN,
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 179
(1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Le-
gal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 121 (1989); Celina Romany, Ain't I a
Feminist?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 23, 24 (1991). See also PAULA GIDDINGS,
WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX
IN AMERICA 64-74 (1984) (describing the different choices African-American
women made when confronted with franchise amendments that seemed to pit
black males against females); Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giv-
ing the Abused Woman Who Kills a Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles,
33 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 261 (1996) (explaining that African-American
women were left out of both the Civil Rights and Suffrage movements of the
nineteenth century); Lind, supra note 83, at 160-166, 176 (describing the
conflict between abolitionists and suffragists).
93. See DAVIS, supra note 88, at 82-86.
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It took a civil war and two constitutional amendments, how-
ever, to extend the vote to former slaves. Even then, the Fif-
teenth Amendment formally enfranchised African-American
males, but purposely excluded women.14 Rather than creating
universal suffrage, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited race
discrimination in voting. The Nineteenth Amendment mimicked
the Fifteenth Amendment language when it extended the vote to
women, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex.95 The
Twenty-Sixth Amendment repeated this language when it guar-
anteed the vote for eighteen year-olds.9 6 None of the amend-
ments created a fundamental right for all to vote.
Universal suffirage is essential if citizens are to recognize
the government as legitimate.97 Otherwise, the government is
an oligarchy-a government without representation and consent
of the governed. Instead of establishing the broad principle of
universal suffrage, the various franchising amendments oper-
ated as piecemeal efforts to appease the demands of particular
subsets of the outsider population. No universal franchise
emerged because different constituencies disagreed about how to
define the capacity to vote. Varied results were assured once the
Constitutional Convention compromised by adopting varied
state standards for voting.98
Ostensibly the Guarantee Clause is the best vehicle with
which to raise the issue of universal suffrage." Article IV of the
Constitution guarantees "to every State in the Union a Republi-
can form of government."'00 Explaining this clause, James Madi-
son defined a republican form of government as "[one] which de-
rives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; see also Lind, supra note 83, at 153-65
(giving a detailed account of the Republican power struggle during Recon-
struction and why it motivated the legislature to extend the franchise to Afri-
can-American men but not to women); id. at 165-66 (describing how the in-
sertion of the word "male" into the Fifteenth Amendment caused suffragists
to oppose its passage).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
97. See JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 22, at 350.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
99. Although the Guarantee Clause applies only to the states and not the
federal government, changes in voter qualifications at the state level also
change the qualifications in federal elections because the constitution pro-
vides for the federal government to use state criteria. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2.
100. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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the people ... .,0 Republics gain their legitimacy from inclu-
siveness: "It is essential to such a government that it be derived
from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable
proportion or a favored class of it .. "102 Without universal suf-
frage, some individuals are unrepresented and therefore are
denied a truly republican form of government. For example,
children are neither proportionally represented nor allowed to
vote, so arguably they do not have a representative government.
Early challenges to malapportionment argued that dispro-
portionate representation violated the Guarantee Clause."3 Un-
fortunately, the Supreme Court rejected such claims as nonjusti-
ciable political questions.' Although a number of scholars have
called for a more active role for the Guarantee Clause,"5 and
Justice O'Connor has hinted that it might be appropriate in
some cases,10 6 so far the Court has used the Guarantee Clause
only to sustain challenged state actions."7 When the Court finally
recognized that voters had a right to complain about dispropor-
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
102. Id.
103. See generally Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding the
Guarantee Clause to raise a nonjusticiable political question when it chal-
lenged the legitimacy of a government not elected according to the state con-
stitution); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (per curiam) (rejecting a Guar-
antee Clause claim for redistricting as a political question); Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (rejecting the Guarantee Clause claim as a politi-
cal question when it challenged the apportionment of congressional districts
in Illinois).
104. See Luther, 48 U.S. at 39; Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 552; South, 339 U.S.
at 277.
105. See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights
in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CuME. L. REV. 287, 299 n.74 ("[Tlhe Court would
have been better off in Baker to hold that malapportionment was justiciable
under the guaranty clause... rather than under the equal protection
clause."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause
Should be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 849 (1994) (arguing that the Court
should hear cases under the Guarantee Clause); Deborah J. Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause should be used
to protect states' rights).
106. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-85 (1992).
107. See generally, e.g., Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897) (holding
that a federal court did not have the power to review a state court decision
validating annexation proceedings); Foster v. Kansas ex rel Johnston, 112
U.S. 201 (1884) (holding constitutional a state statute regulating the removal
of individuals from office).
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tionate representation, it relied on the Equal Protection Clause
rather than the Guarantee Clause."8
Equal protection doctrine requires that those excluded from
the vote must show first that the exclusion was purposeful, and
then that it was not justified.' 9 Hence, the outsiders must dem-
onstrate that they are sufficiently like the insiders who can vote.
To the extent that the outsiders actually are different from the
current voters, they are caught in a bind. Because outsiders are
different, the current voters are unlikely to represent outsider
interests, but outsiders lack the "requirements" for the fran-
chise. Equal protection cannot protect children because they are
not identical to adults.
Children are denied the vote because they are considered ir-
rational, emotional, inexperienced, immature, and unedu-
cated."' All of those critiques assume that the vote is merely a
measure of capacity for political autonomy. If, however, the vote
is a mechanism to balance power to assure that outsider inter-
ests are included in the political negotiations, then children need
the vote.
Lack of political power both reflects and magnifies societal
subordination. As the Supreme Court has noted, "To the extent
that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citi-
zen.""' The disenfranchised are stigmatized at the same time
they are excluded from political discourse. Children are harmed
when their interests are not adequately represented in legisla-
108. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1899 (1996) (striking down a
districting plan because race was the predominant factor); Miller v. Johnson,
115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995) (requiring plaintiffs to prove race is the predomi-
nant factor in the drawing of district lines); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642
(1993) (remanding the case to determine whether bizarre shape of voting dis-
trict suggested racial gerrymandering); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561
(1964) (holding Alabama apportionment scheme violated Equal Protection
Clause); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (holding that whether a state
apportionment scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause presented a jus-
ticable question).
109. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (requiring proof of ex-
press intent to dilute minority votes because equal protection claims require
proof of "discriminatory intent"); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66
(1980) (plurality opinion) (requiring proof of invidious racially discriminatory
purpose to invalidate a multimember district).
110. The closest analogy may be to the mentally disabled. Some states
permit mentally challenged individuals to vote and at least one commentator
has argued that they are entitled to vote. See generally Feldman, supra note
21.
111. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
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tures. Once again, incapacity effectively has rendered them sec-
ond-class citizens.
II. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
Children have diminished rights because they lack auton-
omy, but without autonomy they need more rights to protect
them. So far, there are at least two strategies to resolve this di-
lemma. First, we could increase the autonomy of minors by creat-
ing children's rights. For several years now, scholars have been
debating the nature and extent of children's rights."' Second, we
could create a system of substantive entitlements for children.
For example, the United Nations Convention for the Rights of
the Child suggests guarantees of housing, nourishment, and
education."'
112. See, e.g., Sharon Bishop, Children, Autonomy and the Right to Self
Determination, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PABENTAL AUTHORITY,
AND STATE POWER 154 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds. 1980)
[hereinafter WHOSE CHILD?] (arguing that parental power to control children
is limited in that it must be used to foster future autonomy of child); see also
LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEIR BEST INTEREST? THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL
RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1992) (evaluating arguments that children should
have equal rights); COLIN A. WiNGE, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: A PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDY (1981) (distinguishing between various kinds of children's rights, in-
cluding autonomy rights and rights of protection); Fitzgerald, supra note 2
(arguing for a substantive right both to financial support and protection from
abuse); Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathon 0. Hafen, Abandoning Children to Their
Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37
HARv. INTL. L.J. 449 (1996) (criticizing autonomy rights for children); John
Holt, Liberate Children, in WHOSE CHILD?, supra, at 84 (arguing that children
should have the opportunity to have all rights and duties available to adults);
Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility
and the Public Interest, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 395-98 (proposing children's
right to state provided child support); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Warren
and Burger Courts on State, Parent, and Child Conflict Resolution: A Com-
parative Analysis and Proposed Methodology, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 461, 501
(1985) (arguing for children to have the same constitutional rights as adults
unless "demonstrable evidence exists to justify treating the child differ-
ently."); Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitu-
tional Rights of Children, 27 LOY. U. Cm. L.J. 321 (1996) (critiquing the over-
use of rights to protect children's interests); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
'Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights": The Child's Voice in Defining the
Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 21 (1994) (arguing for positive rights for children
that are defined by children's needs).
113. Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, art. 24, 27, 28, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) [hereinafter
Convention]. For a description of the convention, see THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO "TRAVAUZ
PREPARATOIRES" 10-11 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992); IMPLEMENTING THE
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A. GREATER AuTONOMY FOR CHILDREN
One approach to assisting children has been to expand the
definition of autonomy to allow mature children to make more
decisions for themselves. For example, reproductive rights give
adolescents more control over their sexual lives. Increased auton-
omy for adolescents is a mixed bag, however.114 First, standards of
maturity are hard to establish for a population that varies dra-
matically between exercising considered judgment and rebellious
risk-taking. As a result, we tend to define adolescents who agree
with societal norms as "mature," and those who disagree as
"immature.""5 One example of this arbitrary labeling is that al-
most all girls who ask for court-approved abortions are deemed
mature,"' while many children who ask to discontinue life-
saving treatment are considered immature."7 Part of the prob-
lem is that adolescents often are capable of abstract thinking,
but lack emotional control."' Their lack of impulse control and
perspective, coupled with their heightened susceptibility to peer
pressure, often makes them bad decisionmakers."9 It is nearly
impossible to determine which adolescents are good decision
makers at which times because no clear standard of maturity
exists.
Second, even when adolescents are mature enough to make
sensible decisions, they are unlikely to have resources that en-
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: RESOURCE MOBILIZATION IN
Low-INCoME COUNTRIES 109, 145 (James R. Himes ed., 1995).
114. Indeed, recent research on statutory rape suggests that sexual auton-
omy paints too rosy a picture of adolescent sex. See Oberman, Minor Rights,
supra note 30.
115. Cf id. at 46-53.
116. See id. at 51-52; Suellyn Scarnecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging
Girls: Decision Making in Parental Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 75, 87 (1995).
117. Cf Oberman, Minor Rights, supra note 30, at 53 n.217.
118. See Fred Danner, Cognitive Development in Adolescence, in THE
ADOLESCENT AS DECISION-MAKER: APPLICATIONS TO DEVELOPMENT AND
EDUCATION 51, 56 (Judith Worrell & Fred Danner eds., 1989) (noting that
Piaget's view that adolescents are able to generate hypotheses, reflect on
themselves, and apply logic is inconsistent with adolescents' chaotic emotional
and social lives).
119. See Patricia H. Miller, Theories of Adolescent Development, in THE
ADOLESCENT AS DECISION-MAKER: APPLICATIONS TO DEVELOPMENT AND
EDUCATION 13, 35-36 (Judith Worrell & Fred Danner eds., 1989) (noting that
because adolescents are egocentric, strongly influenced by peers, and believe
they are indestructible, they "believe that they will not become pregnant even
if birth control devices are not used or believe that they can drink and drive
without having an accident.").
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able them to bargain for fair results. Although studies show
that some teens can exercise sound judgment,2 ' they rarely have
the ability to protect themselves when dealing with more power-
ful adults or groups. Currently, we permit children to have
rights only in a limited privatized setting where children are
seen as strong enough to assert their own adversarial rights
against others."'
Third, autonomy rights often carry corresponding duties
that adolescents are ill-equipped to fulfill. For example, teens
who buy cars may not be able to make the payments without
compromising their school performance.'" Similarly, even ma-
ture teen parents rarely have the resources to support them-
selves and their offspring. Ironically, the children's rights
120. Although Piaget originally posited that children reached the most ad-
vanced stage of abstract thinking, called the stage of formal operations, at
around age fourteen, see PIAGET, LOGIC, supra note 34, at 291, subsequent
studies have suggested that most children "show relative lack of certain deci-
sion making skills" including the ability to imagine "risks and future conse-
quences," "recognize the need for independent professional opinions," and un-
derstanding conflicts of interest. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, How OLD is OLD ENOUGH? THE AGES OF RIGHTS AND RE-
SPONSMILITIES 28-29 (1989) [hereinafter How OLD?]; see also Duane F. Alwin,
Aging, Personality, and Social Change: The Stability of Individual Differences
Over the Adult Life Span, in LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 135,
161 (David L. Featherman et al. eds., 1994) (noting studies show a high de-
gree of stability in intelligence scores even before early adolescence); Alan S.
Kaufinan & Jim Flaitz, Intellectual Growth, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT
PSYCHOLOGY 205, 214 (Vincent B. Van Hasselt & Michel Hersen eds., 1987)
(describing Piaget's theory of the most advanced stage of intellectual devel-
opment, the formal operations period, as beginning between the age of eleven
and fifteen and noting that even adults do not "evidence the skills and in-
sights characteristic of this stage of development").
121 Cf. Rodriguez v. Reading Hous. Auth., 8 F.3d 961 (3rd Cir. 1993)
(holding that a minor cannot apply for public housing unless the minor is
emancipated). The very idea of emancipation is problematic. One study sug-
gested that most of the children who were emancipated chose that option at
the urging of an adult such as a parent, step-parent, parole officer, or police
officer. After emancipation, many children could not be found at all. Of those
who could be located, most had dropped out of high school, were unemployed,
and had no stable place of residence. Hence, children have the "right" to be
impoverished and homeless. See Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor
Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
239 (1992). For further critiques of emancipation, see generally Gregory A.
Loken, "'Thrownaway" Children and Throwaway Parenthood, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 1715 (1995); Chadwick N. Gardner, Note, Don't Come Cryin' to Daddy!
Emancipation of Minors: When Is a Parent Tree at Last' from the Obligation
of Child Support?, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAm. L. 927 (1995).
122. See Betsy White, A Teacher Says No to Teenagers' Jobs, CH. TRIB.,
July 18, 1989, at C1.
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movement may have been more successful at creating children's
responsibilities.Iu
Historically, granting the vote to a younger population
meant redefining that group as adults for most purposes. Thus
when the voting age was lowered to eighteen, eighteen-year-olds
were deemed to be adults who no longer needed parental support
and were bound by their contracts. However, calling eighteen-
year-olds adults did not mean that they no longer needed fund-
ing for college education, render them more employable, or give
them greater bargaining power. Accordingly, they carried adult
responsibilities without adult resources.
Whatever the value of increasing autonomy for teens, it is
not a solution for pre-adolescent children.2 4 Although we may
quibble about the age at which we draw the line, at some point
children are simply too young to have developed either the
judgment or the requisite bargaining power to rely solely on
their autonomous decisions about their welfare. As a result, the
literature suggesting a political role for children characterizes
itself as "facetious" or a "thought experiment."'' After all, few of
us are, or ever have been, fully autonomous actors. Both as chil-
dren and as adults, our choices always are constrained because
we all live in a world populated by others. As Kathryn Abrams
123. The most dramatic increase in juvenile responsibilities has been the
widespread practice of treating children as if they were adults in criminal
settings. See Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Deci-
sion to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L. REV. 507, 515
(1995) (documenting that more juveniles are being tried as adult criminals).
For a discussion of this phenomenon see, for example, Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966) (listing the determinative factors to be considered
when deciding whether to transfer juveniles to adult court); George Bundy
Smith & Gloria M. Dabiri, The Judicial Role in the Treatment of Juvenile De-
linquents, 3 J.L. & POLY 347, 364-65 (1995) (noting the "get tough" public
sentiment toward delinquency and a series of "get-tough" approaches to the
treatment of young offenders); Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the
Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court,
90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1254, 1256 (1996) (supporting a discretionary transfer ap-
proach that makes adult criminal discipline a last resort for juvenile offend-
ers). At least one scholar has suggested that teens should not be executed be-
cause they are too young to vote. See Timothy P. O'Neill, Is It OK to Execute
Murderers Too Young to Vote?, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 8, 1987, § 1, at 16.
124. Most of the developmental literature seems to indicate that cognitive
decisionmaking skills are not fully developed until some time in adolescence,
usually around age fourteen. See How OLD?, supra note 120, at 28-29.
125. See Peterson, supra note 47, at 156.
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suggests, we can exercise only partial autonomy. '26 The younger
we are, the less autonomy we possess.
B. SUBSTANTIVE ENTITLEMENTS FOR CHILDREN
If children lack the autonomy necessary for rights, then
perhaps we should find a different source for the rights children
require to protect their interests. Barbara Woodhouse has sug-
gested that rights should be based on needs. '27 She uses as her
model the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
that creates substantive entitlements to items like nourishment
and education.'2 One advantage of this model is that it addresses
the communitarian critique by requiring signatory states to as-
sure minimal levels of welfare for children,129 which squarely
places some responsibility for children on the larger community.
Although laudable, that approach fails to account for at
least four problems. First, need is not self-defining. One per-
son's definition of need is another's definition of luxury. The po-
litically powerful may be tempted to label the needs of others as
mere luxuries. Accordingly, it is hard to gauge the extent or the
limits of rights that are derived solely from needs. Second, all
nations have limited resources, and a general right to nourish-
ment or education fails to provide a method for prioritizing com-
peting needs. Third, substantive entitlements not only fail to
prioritize among needs, but they also fail to allocate the burdens
of payment among the various groups that might be obligated.
The duty to provide necessary food or education could be allo-
cated to parents, local communities, religious organizations, or
the state. Fourth, a generalized substantive entitlement is almost
impossible to enforce. The entitlements do not bind nations to
126. For a discussion of the idea of partial autonomy, see Kathryn Abrams,
Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 304, 346-48 (1995).
127. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private Family:
The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protec-
tion and Education, 57 OIO ST. L.J. 393, 420 (1996).
128. See Convention, supra note 113, at art. 24, § 2 ("States... shall pur-
sue full implementation of this right [to the highest attainable standard of
health] and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures: ... To combat
disease and malnutrition... through the provision of adequate nutritious
foods and clean drinking-water .... "); art. 28, § 1 ("States... recognize the
right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right pro-
gressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular:...
Make primary education compulsory and available free to all....").
129. See id.
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commit any of their resources to children, so no viable enforce-
ment mechanisms exist.
C. THE VALUE OF THE VOTE FOR CHILDREN
Vesting children with either autonomy rights or substantive
entitlements would not give them the power they need for politi-
cal interest group bargaining. Legislatures would remain free to
restrict or eliminate those rights and entitlements. The franchise,
on the other hand, would give voters the power to: (1) define
which members of the community count; (2) assure that indi-
viduals and groups get an equal share of a representative's at-
tention and services; (3) enable individuals to band together to
negotiate for their collective interests; and (4) enable individuals
to influence public policy. When children are denied access to
the political system, they are stigmatized as non-entities:
'No living creature can be recognized as one of the people, if that liv-
ing creature has not rational faculties by which it can either consent
or refuse to become the subject of government.' If '[o]xen and horses
cannot give their consent to government... neither can madmen,
idiots, or immature children give their consent; and therefore, it fol-
lows, on account of this natural incapacity, that none of these can be
recognized as people." 30
Before children can be taken seriously, they need to be counted
as valuable members of the political community. We call such
members voters.
Voters also garner more of a representative's time and at-
tention. Various issues compete for the attention of politicians,
and politicians are most responsive to input that could affect
their political future. Although the most influential voices are
unfortunately those that are best funded, politicians also re-
spond to large quantities of votes. Children need to be counted
in the vote in some way both to get their issues on the agenda,
and to have their perspectives on those issues heard.
Of course, the most effective lobbying groups are those that
are well-organized. That is a problem for children given their
lack of resources and, depending on their age, lack of organizing
abilities. Strong lobbies are not always organized by their indi-
vidual constituents, however. Sometimes lobbies are created
and maintained by volunteers or professionals who recruit indi-
130. 2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE
CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, TO REVISE AND AMEND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 726 (statement of
William Greene), quoted in Cogan, supra note 75, at 494.
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vidual supporters and serve their interests. That is largely the
method of the American Association of Retired Persons, for ex-
ample. However, if the individuals to be served wield few votes,
those who would organize on the individuals' behalf have limited
incentive and capacity to serve them.
Finally, the vote reinforces the individual's capacity to in-
fluence social policy. Policymakers and elected officials pay close
attention to the opinions of their constituents; on contested is-
sues, politicians often "count noses." Because children are ex-
cluded from that count, they are denied any input into social
policies. Children often write their senators or congressional
representatives, but I suspect that they may be taken less seri-
ously than the letters and complaints of adult constituents who
can vote.
Of course the vote alone is rarely sufficient to transform a
relatively powerless minority into a powerful political player.
The Fifteenth Amendment did not magically solve the problems
of racism, nor did the Nineteenth Amendment eliminate sexism.
However, the vote is one crucial step toward empowerment.
IV. ONE CHILD, ONE VOTE:
PROXY VOTING FOR CHILDREN
A. PoLiTcAL POWER WITHOUT AUTONOMY
How can children exercise political power when they have
no autonomy? Legal rights have long been thought to depend on
autonomy and choice. The entire idea of rights deriving from a
social contract assumes citizens' capacity to evaluate and will-
ingly enter the contract. As a result, dependents have long been
thought to have few, if any, rights. The problem with this theory,
of course, is its characterization of the relationship between
rights and reason. Merely because parties have a diminished
capacity to reason should not mean that they have lesser rights
of protection.
We should think of rights as mechanisms to balance power,
not as chosen options. 3 ' For example, several scholars have ar-
gued that the right to have an abortion is not so much an unfet-
tered right of personal choice, as a necessary means to assure
131. For example, women need to be able to control their reproductive
destiny in order to participate economically, socially, and politically on the
same terms as men. Accordingly, abortion rights are more logically based in
equal protection than privacy and autonomy.
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that men and women have equal opportunities.' 2 Similarly,
most procedural due process rights can be characterized as at-
tempts to balance the powers of litigants. Voting rights are
also mechanisms to balance power.
If rights are designed to balance power, we must be careful
about the way we define and exercise power. Robert Dahl de-
fines power as the ability to get another to do something he
would not otherwise do.' Of course, there are many different
ways to induce others to act. We can try to coerce them, in
which case power means the capacity to dominate, restrict, or
limit others. This kind of power envisions hierarchies that place
some individuals in control of others.135 Children seem unlikely
candidates for hierarchical power. They could not command the
respect of those they sought to rule and arguably would be inca-
pable of sensibly exercising such hierarchical power. The novel
Lord of the Flies captures our fears of a world in which children
exercise power over others to terrorize them and satisfy their
own arbitrary pleasures.' 6 We need not necessarily control oth-
ers to change their behavior, however. Another kind of power is
the power to persuade.'37 Through appeals to virtue, fairness, or
self-interest, we can convince others to act in ways they otherwise
132. See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, Beyond the Liberal Idea of Privacy: Toward
a Positive Right of Autonomy, in JUDGING THE CONSTITUTION: CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 287, 296 (Michael W. McCann & Gerald L.
Houseman eds., 1989) (arguing that the concept of gender equality provides a
better framework for feminist goals than privacy); Donald H. Regan, Rewrit-
ing Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569 (1979) (arguing that anti-abortion
laws violate the Equal Protection Clause by placing special burdens on preg-
nant women); Rutherford, supra note 48, at 73-74 (comparing the lives of
Benjamin Franklin and his sister to demonstrate that reproductive freedom is
necessary to assure equal opportunities for men and women); Laurence H.
Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Du-
ties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330, 335-36 (1985)
(suggesting that the right to an abortion should be grounded in equal protec-
tion rather than privacy).
133. See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 48, at 39-41 (discussing how variousjurisdiction cases balance power between the litigants).
134. See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, in POLITICAL POWER: A
READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 79, 80 (Roderick Bell et al. eds., 1969).
135. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OR-
GANIZATION 152 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons eds., 1947)
("Tower'... is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will
be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance..
136. WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (1959).
137. For a discussion of the power of persuasion, see DENNIS H. WRONG,
POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES AND USES 32-34 (1979).
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would not have acted. Persuasion requires strong rhetorical
skills, a well-developed capacity to reason, and adequate access
to those we seek to persuade."' Children themselves are un-
likely to be able to exercise the power to persuade in the political
process, but they can be given indirect access through others
who act in their behalf.
Power can also be conceived in a less hierarchical way-
power to accomplish something, as opposed to power over oth-
ers. '39 Unlike hierarchical power, the power to accomplish may
be embedded in a network, and the person with the most power
may not be the one at the top of the hierarchy, but the one in the
middle of the net with the most connections or relationships.
Networked power is paradoxical because those involved in mul-
tiple relationships have more connections to get help, but also
are tied to more people who have demands and needs. Thus,
networks of relationships can be both a resource and a hindrance.
Children can and should have the benefit of the power that de-
rives from their relationships and enables them to grow into
relatively autonomous adults.
Although children may have difficulty exercising power over
others, they can exercise the power that comes from relation-
ships. The best way to harness this power for children is
through representation by their parents. Indeed, the idea of
democracy through representation has very traditional roots in
our American polity.
B. REPRESENTATION: VOTING BY PROXY
As the federalists who drafted the Constitution noted, the
nation is far too expansive and populated to be run by a series of
town meetings."4 Not every citizen can directly participate in
political decisions. Consequently, the new government was set
up as a representative one. The disputes about representation
centered not on whether it should exist, but on how large the
congressional districts should be141 and how the representatives
should be apportioned."' The large states argued for votes pro-
portionate to either taxes or the number of free inhabitants,
138. See id. at 33.
139. Cf Palmeri, supra note 36, at 117-21 (arguing that there are two
kinds of liberty: freedom from constraint and freedom that enables or empow-
ers and that the freedom to accomplish is the kind appropriate for children).
Palmeri may have derived her view from Isaiah Berlin. See generally Isaiah
Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969).
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while the small states wanted equal votes for each state.14 Pain-
fully aware of the revolutionary demand for representation, the
founders were committed to broad-based popular representation
in at least one house of Congress.'" In order to avoid contro-
versy over the nature of the representatives chosen, the Constitu-
tion adopted the criteria for states to use in selecting representa-
tives. 145
The way we choose our representatives affects how they
view their duties. To understand these duties, however, we also
must consider what we mean by "representation." Different po-
litical philosophers use different definitions. For some, repre-
sentation is merely a mechanism to authorize the government to
act on behalf of consenting individuals;' once authorized, repre-
sentatives have few duties. Others see representation as creat-
ing advocacy for particular political units like states or cities.47
Still others see it as advocacy of specific interests.' These vari-
ous definitions turn on whether we expect politics to function as
a deliberative debate by wise politicians who will independently
discover the public good in the course of their debates, or as a
bargaining bazaar in which various groups negotiate for accept-
able results.
The distinction between deliberative politics and interest
representation is too sharply drawn. Although elements of both
are found in our system, neither alone adequately describes our
form of political representation. Some deliberative debate occurs
140. See THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961).
141. See THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 214 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82-83 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
142. For a description of the debate over representation in the constitu-
tional convention, see JACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL MEANINGs: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 56-93 (1996).
143. See id. at 60-61.
144. See THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (James Madison).
145. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. For an interesting discussion of the his-
tory of this provision, see JACK N. RAKOVE, supra note 142, at 106.
146. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 218 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin
Books 1968) (1651).
147. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American
Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 445 (1989).
148. For a discussion of Burke's views that the elected represent fixed in-
terests, see HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 174-
78 (1967). For a more modem view of representing interests, see LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 94-99 (1994).
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in which our representatives are charged with exercising their
sound judgment. They are more than mere automatons who
cast ballots for predetermined interests. However, representa-
tives do consider the various interests of their constituencies,
and the relative strengths of those interests is crucial. Voting
for a representative is like giving the representative a proxy to
vote on our behalf. We choose our proxy holder both because we
trust her judgment and because she holds the other proxies of
those who share our interests.
Those who advocate a purely deliberative democracy, in
which elites act out of public concern for the best interests of all,
believe that representatives represent the polity as a whole,
rather than a particular subset.149 The founders were justifiably
skeptical of this notion. Madison doubted that politicians would
always be wise or virtuous,5 and he doubted that it was possible
or desirable to have uniformity.5 ' Accordingly, representatives
could not act for the entire nation, but rather must represent
particular subsets. Indeed, if the founders had accepted a purely
uniform view of representation, they would have had no cause
for the Revolution.'52 The war grew out of a concern that the
colonies were unrepresented in Parliament; if all the members of
Parliament represented the interests of the entire empire, then
the colonies should not have been concerned about being excluded
from Parliament. The cry of "no taxation without representa-
tion" only made sense if the Colonies thought their particular in-
terests needed to be represented.
Not all individuals or interests were to be represented, how-
ever. The idea that only autonomous individuals can be repre-
sented in the political process can be traced back to Hobbes.'
Hobbes saw representation as a way for the representative to bind
those she represented.'54 Because no one could be bound without
consent, it would be impossible to represent someone incapable of
149. See, e.g., BuRKE's POLITICS, supra note 69, at 116.
150. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm."); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("If
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to gov-
ern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be nec-
essary.").
151. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
152. See SHKLAR, supra note 69, at 39, 42-46.
153. See HOBBES, supra note 146, at 218.
154. See id. at 218.
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consent. Hobbes expressly applied this principle to children,
whom he believed could be cared for, but not represented. 5
For theorists like Hobbes who think that representation is
merely a form of authority, the representative has few duties to
her constituents once she has been authorized by an election.
Continuing contact with constituents is unnecessary because the
representative is to exercise her own judgment;'56 therefore, the
representative need not be particularly similar to her constituents.
In contrast, our founders saw representation as a form of
mirroring.'57 Representatives should be as much like those they
represent as possible. The legislature should be a microcosm of
the nation. As the federalist John Adams expressed at the time
'of the American Revolution, the "assembly should be an exact
portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think,
feel, reason, and act like them .... "I Representatives should
not only express their constituents' views, but should also be as
similar to them as possible. Some anti-federalists took this no-
tion quite literally: 'The very term, representative, implies, that
the person or body chosen.., should resemble those who ap-
point them .... [A] stranger to the country [should] be able to
form a just idea of their character, by knowing that of their rep-
resentatives. They are the sign-the people are the thing signi-
fied."59 For these purposes, then, personal characteristics such
as race, religion, gender, or age may be important measures of
the sufficiency of the representative because "[s]ympathy was
most likely to exist... when electors and the elected shared un-
derlying traits." 160
155. See id. at 219.
156. Modem scholars are quite critical of this focus on the formalities of
election to the exclusion of accountability while in office. See, e.g., Kathryn
Abrams, Relationships of Representation in Voting Rights Act Jurisprudence,
71 TFx L. REV. 1409 (1993) (suggesting that representation is an ongoing re-
lationship between the constituents and their representatives that continues
after the moment of election).
157. For discussions of the concept that legislatures should mirror their
constituencies, see PITKIN, supra note 148, at 60-91; RAKOVE, supra note 145,
at 203-43.
158. 4 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 205 (Boston, Little
Brown 1851).
159. Essay of Brutus (November 15, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 377 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1988) [hereinafter THE ANTI-
FEDERALIST].
160. RAKOVE, supra note 145, at 204.
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This view presents both problems and opportunities for
children. Taken literally, if the representative must mimic the
characteristics of her constituents, then the representative for
children should be a child. However, as Lani Guinier has sug-
gested, focusing on these surface similarities is not sufficient be-
cause representatives are to be judged not on their physical
characteristics, but on their ability to represent their constitu-
ents' interests. 6' Thus, mirroring viewed more generally calls
for proportional representation.162
Thus, a third group of theorists sees representatives not as
reflective of their constituents, but as advocates for particular
interests.' Under this view, what counts is how well a repre-
sentative can advance the interests of those who elected her. It
is largely irrelevant whether the representative resembles her
constituents. Instead, she must be able to articulate reasoned
arguments. For example, Alexander Hamilton thought that
"mlechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined... to
give their votes to merchants" because the latter would ade-
quately represent their interests, but be more articulate. 1 For a
few theorists, like Burke, it does not matter whether the inter-
ests are represented proportionally, but rather that the view-
points are presented to the assembly. 65 However, for most pro-
ponents of interest representation, including the founders, the
numbers matter very much.'" As John Adams explained,
"[E]qual interests among the people should have equal interests
in the representative body." 67 Interests cannot be adequately
represented unless the affected groups have enough power to get
their ideas considered seriously. More than mere power is at
stake; as John Stuart Mill argued, democracies are legitimate
only insofar as they include an adequate cross-section of the
16L See GUINJER, supra note 148, at 67 (arguing that "[diepending on
black politicians... is naive" and results in tokenism that cannot be fully ef-
fective to advance the interests of African-Americans).
162. See PITK]N, supra note 148, at 61.
163. See id. at 168-89.
164. THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 214 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961).
165. See PITKI, supra note 148, at 171-77.
166. See MILL, supra note 22, at 350 (referring to "representation in pro-
portion to numbers" as the "first principle of democracy"); GUINR, supra
note 148, at 122 (arguing that "the aggregating rule is proportionality rather
than winner-take-all").
167. ADAvS, supra note 158.
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populace.' Excluding any significant portion of the population
from representation makes democracy a form of tyranny.
Children may be too immature both to vote and to hold po-
litical office.'69 How, then, can we take their interests into ac-
count? The answer is to create proxies, so that their interests
and voting power are expressed through others. Proxies are a
common system for delegating the right to vote.'70 In fact, the
entire representative system of democracy can be seen as giving
elected representatives proxies to vote for their constituents. 7'
Although not explicitly called proxy voting, this sort of indirect
representation was built into the original Constitution. For ex-
ample, senators were to be chosen not by the people directly, but
by the state legislatures.72 Similarly, the president is not
elected directly by the voters, but by the electoral college.ID Just
as members of Congress can vote on behalf of the populace,
proxy-holders could vote on behalf of children. The proxy-holder
would simply be another kind of representative who exercises
political power on behalf of children.
168. See MILL, supra note 22, at 346-350 (arguing that proportionate rep-
resentation of all minorities is essential to the very idea of democracy).
169. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing 25 as the minimum age
for a state representative); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (mandating that a
Senator be at least 30 years old); U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 1, cl. 5 (requiring the
President to be at least 35); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (allowing citizens age
18 and over to vote).
170. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.22 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 212 (1991).
171. See PITKIN, supra note 148, at 85. See also Frank I. Michelman, Fam-
ily Quarrel, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 1163, 1169 (1996) (referring to political rep-
resentatives as "elected parliamentary proxies"); Robin L. West, Taking Pref-
erences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659, 668 (1990) (referring to votes as a
"proxy function").
172. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII, § 1.
173. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. These electors are not bound to
vote for any particular candidate for president and occasionally vote contrary
to the popular vote cast in their state. In 1956, 1960, 1972, 1976, and 1988 at
least one elector failed to vote for the candidate who carried the popular vote
in his state. See AMERICA VOTES 21: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN ELECTION STATISTICS 14, 20, 22, 28, 30 (Richard M. Scammon &
Alice V. McGillivray eds., 1994). At least twice, the winner of the popular vote
has not been elected president by the electoral college. In 1876, Rutherford B.
Hayes was elected president over Samuel J. Tilden who received more popu-
lar votes. Similarly, in 1888, Benjamin Harrison became president, defeating
Grover Cleveland, who carried more popular votes. See U.S. GOvT PRINTING
OFFICE, NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE
PRESIDENT, S. DOC. No. 102-114, at 394 (1992).
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In one crucial way, those who vote on behalf of children
would differ from other political representatives. Unlike the
general populace, which chooses the legislators who will repre-
sent it, children could not choose their proxy-holders. As a con-
sequence, the proxy-holders would not be politically accountable
for their votes. Hence, the proxy-holders would be "virtual" rep-
resentatives rather than actual representatives. As Burke de-
fined it, "virtual representation" exists when "there is a com-
munion of interests and a sympathy in feelings and desires
between those who act in the name of... people and the people
in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually
chosen by them."'7 4 Virtual representation has a mixed history
at best. Sometimes, it has been an excuse to exclude outsiders
by pretending that their interests are adequately represented by
insiders. For example, it was argued that men virtually repre-
sented women before the passage of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment.75 Virtual representation should not be used to disenfran-
chise outsiders who could choose their own representatives, nor
to assign insiders to represent outsiders. However, when actual
representation is impossible, virtual representation is better
than no representation at all. The focus, then, should be on
fairly choosing the virtual representatives or proxy-holders.
Who should hold proxies for children? I suggest the follow-
ing criteria: (1) the representative should have a stake in a very
substantial shared venture with the child; (2) the representative
should be personally familiar with the needs and circumstances
of the child; (3) the child should have ready and frequent access
to the representative so the child can express herself in her own
terms whenever possible; (4) the representative should be ac-
countable to the child in some fashion, either emotionally or le-
gally; and (5) the representative should share an emotional bond
with the child that promotes caring, sympathy, and empathy.
Although these are new criteria, they resemble criteria that
are prevalent in our history and legal culture. For example,
Madison suggested that representatives should know their con-
stituents, should be accountable to them, and would necessarily
174. BURKE's POLITICS, supra note 69, at 494.
175. See HOFF, supra note 73, at 101-02. Hoff also notes that when Susan
B. Anthony voted in an election in 1872, she was arrested for violating a fed-
eral statute that prohibited white men from canceling out black votes by
casting more than one ballot. The implication is that when a woman votes she
is merely increasing the political power of men in her family. See id. at 152-
53.
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have some affection for them.76 Similarly, the anti-federalists'
anxiety about the large size of congressional districts reflected
their demand that representatives should be accessible and
share genuine sympathy and feeling for their constituents.'77 Al-
though federalists mocked the anti-federalists for emphasizing
the importance of a strong emotional connection between repre-
sentatives and constituents,' 78 emotional connections to voters
have long historical roots going back to Burke.'79 In advancing
affection and sympathy for children, I mean something more
personal than Burke's demand that representatives be aware of
their constituents' feelings, however. I speak of personal con-
nections. Perhaps the closest description comes in modern rela-
tional feminist literature that stresses nurturing, empathy, and
context.8° A strong emotional bond may minimize the risk of ei-
ther callous assumptions or self-interested disregard.
More than empathy is required, though. The representative
must also know the precise circumstances of the child. For ex-
ample, a relative living at a distance may love a child but lack
the day-to-day knowledge of what a child needs in her life. Such
knowledge must be built on the constant contact that enables
children to express themselves freely and often. Without such
contact, representatives are likely to misunderstand the child's
perspective or to freeze the child at a young age, losing track of
how a child's needs change.
176. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison).
177. See Letter from the Federal Farmer (December 31, 1787), in THE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 159, at 264-70.
178. See RAKOVE, supra note 145, at 241-42.
179. See BURKE'S POLITICS, supra note 69, at 494; see also PITKrN, supra
note 148, at 183-84.
180. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (suggesting that men and women
have different forms of moral reasoning, with women concentrating more on
relationships and empathy); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH
TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION (1984); Judith Areen, A Need for Caring, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1067 (1988) (arguing that justice must include caring); Lynne
N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987) (arguing
that law should incorporate empathy and context); Toni M. Massaro, Empa-
thy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989) (calling for reform to be responsive to multiple
voices and communities); Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking
About Justice, 1989 ETHICS 229 (suggesting that distinguishing between the
ethic of justice and the ethic of care obfuscates attempts to improve moral and
political theory).
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The best representatives will have a personal stake in im-
proving the children's circumstances, preferably through living
with them. Those who live together share the same standard of
living and often experience some of the same problems. In fact,
the Constitution presumes that residence is a measure of shared
interests when it groups voters by states and congressional dis-
tricts. 1' Families share interests to a greater extent than resi-
dents in voting districts because they share both residence and
kinship bonds. 82 Those who do not have a personal stake in the
children's welfare may be less zealous in pursuing it, and may
even discount the extent of children's needs. Courts have often
used this notion of a shared stake in an enterprise to measure
how suitable a representative is.'83 For example, the Supreme
Court has refused to permit "mere 'strangers" to represent other
taxpayers in challenging the validity of a tax.', Although we
apply stricter limits on who can represent us in litigation, we
should require some kind of a stake or shared interest to hold a
proxy vote for children. Shared residence may be the best evi-
dence of such a shared interest.
Finally, representatives of children should have some moral
or legal duty to the children that renders them accountable. For
example, parents are legally obligated to support their children
and trustees owe fiduciary duties to their beneficiaries. Ac-
countability in this sense reflects a long-term connection that
justifies a proxy. However, children should not have a claim to
sue proxy holders for their votes. Permitting such litigation would
be far too divisive. Nevertheless, parents should inform their
181. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. For a
discussion and critique of residential voting districts as interest groups enti-
tled to representation, see GUINIER, supra note 148, at 121, 124, 127-37.
182. Lani Guinier draws the analogy between geographic districting and
families: " M]embership in the territorial constituency is like membership in a
family, with the former imposed by residence and the latter by kinship. Like
family, geographic districts may not reflect conscious choice; as 'compulsory
constituencies,' they nevertheless reflect ties that bind." GUINIER, supra note
148, at 129.
183. See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388,
399-400 (1980) (explaining that the "personal stake" requirement relating to
the case-or-controversy doctrine is met in class actions simply by class certifi-
cation notwithstanding the subsequent loss of a "personal stake" by the class
representative); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985)
(explaining that the certification of a class "is not sufficient in itself to bestow
standing on individuals or a class who lacked the requisite personal stake at
the outset" of the litigation).
184. Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 1786 (1996).
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children whether they voted and how they voted. Ideally, parents
would use proxies to educate their children about political issues
and voting. We could foster this educational function by per-
mitting children to accompany their parents while they voted.
Although such methods of accountability are far from perfect, at
least they would give children some input in predictable ways.
Practically, these criteria mean that in most cases the proxy
for children's votes would be held by the parent or parents with
whom the children reside. Parents who live with their children
share the same standard of living and neighborhood. They in-
teract with the children on a daily basis and are therefore more
likely to be emotionally involved, aware of the children's needs
and perspectives, and available to listen. Because their lives are
intimately intertwined with the children economically, they have
a personal, as well as an altruistic, stake in advancing the chil-
dren's financial welfare. Thus, if a child lives with both parents,
each parent should get a proxy worth one-half vote for each child.
If the parents live apart, then the parent with whom the child
primarily resides should get a proxy worth one vote for each
child. Note that I distinguish here between residence and legal
custody; sometimes a parent may have legal custody rights, as in
joint custody, without actually holding primary residential re-
sponsibility for a child."5 Such a parent would not have a proxy.
Only parents who hold primary residential responsibility for
children would have proxies, both because they would have a
greater shared stake in the child's financial welfare, and because
they would be more accessible and more likely to know precisely
what the child needs.
Giving proxies to parents to vote on behalf of their children
is consistent with current law, which presumes that parents act
in the best interest of their children.'86 For example, parents are
185. For examples of state statutes that differentiate between joint cus-
tody and primary residential custody, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103 (1996);
IOWA CODE § 598.1 (1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2-4 (1992). See also In re the Marriage of Carol J. Allison, 887 P.2d 1217,
1228 (Mont. 1994) (denying the petition of a father with joint custody to
change the primary residential custody of his children from his wife to him-
self).
186. See Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State
Supervention of Parental Autonomy, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD: THE
PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT 153, 154 (Willard Gaylin & Ruth Macklin eds.,
1982) ("To be an adult who is a parent is to be presumed in law to have the
capacity, authority, and responsibility to determine and to do what is good for
one's children.").
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presumed to act in their children's best interest when they consent
to medical treatment,'87 bind children to some contracts,' per-
mit minors to marry,'89 make legal claims for children, 90 exercise
constitutional rights on their behalf,' or even waive some con-
stitutional rights.92 In each of these instances, we permit or
even require parents to act for their children who are too young
to make decisions for themselves. Parents are at least as compe-
187. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620-21 (1979) (permitting parents
to commit their children to a mental health facility without a hearing); Hart v.
Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 391 (Conm. Super. Ct. 1972) (holding that parents could
consent to a kidney transplant from one minor child to another).
188. The general rule is that minors' contracts may be rescinded within a
reasonable time after majority. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 14
(1981). Nevertheless, courts have permitted parents to bind their minor chil-
dren to contracts in some circumstances. See, e.g., Shields v. Gross, 563 F.
Supp. 1253, 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (binding actress Brooke Shields to the con-
tract her mother made for her while Brooke was a minor); Peck v. Dill, 581
So. 2d 800, 804 (Ala. 1991) (holding that a child was bound by the subrogation
clause in his parents' insurance contract); Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3
(Cal. 1956) (holding that a minor is bound by an agreement signed by a parent
to have medical malpractice claims submitted to arbitration); McKinstry v.
Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, 405 N.W.2d 88, 99 (Mich. 1987) (holding
that parents can enter into arbitration agreements on behalf of minor pa-
tients); Hamrick v. Hospital Serv. Corp., 296 A.2d 15, 17 (R.I. 1972) (binding a
child to a subrogation clause of a medical service contract his parents had
signed).
189. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-104 (Michie 1987) (allowing parents
of minors who marry without parental consent to set aside the marriage);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-30 (West 1995) (prohibiting the issuance of a
marriage license to any applicant under age eighteen without written paren-
tal consent); Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (refusing
to permit a minor to marry without parental consent even though she argued
that consent was wrongfully withheld).
190. See, e.g., In re Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R. Co., 788 F.2d 1280,
1283 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that legal action may be maintained on behalf of
the minor by his natural parent); Stevenson v. Hawthorne Elementary Sch.,
579 N.E.2d 852, 855 (1ll. 1991) (holding that a mother was entitled to main-
tain a tort action on behalf of her minor child).
19L See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 n.6 (1972); Callahan v.
Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 687 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a father could assert
his child's constitutional right to freedom of religion); In re Baby K, 832 F.
Supp. 1022, 1030-31 (E.D. Va. 1993) (explaining that a parent may assert a
child's constitutional right to life).
192. See Beldon v. State, 657 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a sixteen-year-old's guilty plea was defective because a child
cannot unilaterally waive his constitutional rights). But see In re East, 663
N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (noting that "no case in Ohio 'has held
that a parent can waive the constitutional right of a minor in a Juvenile Court
or criminal case!" (quoting In re Collins, 253 N.E.2d 824,827 (Ohio Ct. App.
1969)).
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tent to vote for their children as they are to make medical deci-
sions for them.
Nevertheless, the presumption that parents will act in the
best interest of their children is troubling. We know that some
parents act selfishly and neglect or abuse their children. Indeed,
some of the very cases cited to establish the presumption have
bothersome facts.'93 Consequently, it might -seem that courts or
other agencies should evaluate the quality of familial relation-
ships before granting proxies. Significant risks arise from such
state evaluations of families, however, because the state may
misjudge families that vary from some unstated norm.'94
Part of the problem is that we do not have any universal
standard for what constitutes children's "best interest." Appro-
priate standards vary dramatically based on the culture in
which children are living. For example, the Amish believe that a
high school education may corrupt their children, while others
believe that education is the key to their children's future. Even
definitions of abuse and neglect are subject to cultural varia-
tion.'95 In a multicultural society, the solution has been to dele-
193. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 611 (1979) (raising the possibility
that the parents dumped a healthy adolescent into a psychiatric facility); Moe,
669 F.2d at 68 (hinting that the mother opposed her pregnant teenaged
daughter's marriage to protect the mother's welfare check); Shields, 563 F.
Supp. at 1253-54 (posing the question whether Shields's stage-door mother
was so bent on making her daughter a star that she was willing to sell her
daughter's nude pictures for a pittance). Of course, it may be that the issue of
whether the parents act in their children's best interest only arises in the liti-
gated cases.
194. See Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reap-
praisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887,
888-89 (1975) (suggesting that the state may be culturally biased in the way it
labels neglected children); Rutherford, supra note 48, at 59-60 (noting the risk
that courts may misjudge families that look "different").
195. For example, most American jurisdictions consider ritual female cir-
cumcision to be physically abusive, although it is considered appropriate in
some cultures. See generally, e.g., Kay Boulware-Miller, Female Circumci-
sion: Challenges to the Practice as a Human Rights Violation, 8 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 155 (1985); Katherine Brennan, The Influence of Cultural Rela-
tivism on International Human Rights Law: Female Circumcision as a Case
Study, 7 LAW & INEQ. J. 367 (1989); William E. Brigman, Circumcision as
Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337 (1984-85);
Lori Ann Larson, Female Genital Mutilation in the United States: Child Abuse
or Constitutional Freedom? 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 237 (1996); Note, What's
Culture Got To Do With It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female Cir-
cumcision, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1944 (1993). Similarly, there are cultural dis-
putes about where to draw the line between abuse and discipline. See Dump-
son v. Daniel M., cited in JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY
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gate these decisions to parents, intervening only when the
health or safety of the children requires it. Indeed, the freedom
of parents to raise their children as they see fit has been ele-
vated to the level of a fundamental constitutional right.196 Inevi-
tably, some parents will abuse the right to act on behalf of their
children. For example, selfish parents, or parents who simply
equated their children's financial interests with their own, might
vote against a school funding referendum to reduce their own
tax burden even though they believed the referendum would
benefit their own children.
In an imperfect world, then, the question must be whether
children as a group would be better off with or without voting
proxies for their parents. Currently, neither children nor their
parents can vote on behalf of children, so all children are excluded
from the political bargaining process. Under the proposed system,
children would be able to participate through their parents. Al-
though some parents would abuse the proxies, many would use
them to benefit their children. Those children with responsible
parents, presumably the majority, would be better off. The chil-
dren whose parents misused the vote would be balanced by those
with similarly situated parents who voted in children's best inter-
est. The system would only harm the majority of children if the
bad parents outnumbered the good ones; in that case, however, we
should rethink our entire system of privatized family law that
vests parents with the authority to raise their children. 97
We vest parents with power not because we believe parents
are perfect, but because we prefer family decisions to institutional
or governmental ones. Few of us trust relatively impersonal bu-
reaucracies to care or provide for our children. Thus, we face a
difficult decision about who should exercise the proxies for the
children who need them the most: those not in the care of their
parents. Many children are now wards of the state, living in foster
homes or institutions.9 ' In other contexts, we have chosen to cre-
LAW 1399 (3d ed. 1992) (describing an unreported case in which an immigrant
father was convicted for child abuse because his cultural standards for physi-
cal discipline were considered "excessive" by American standards).
196. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
197. See generally Krause, supra note 112, at 395-98 (proposing more
communal duties for supporting children); Minow, supra note 2 (arguing that
privatizing the rights of children excludes them from the public forum); Jana
B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1443
(critiquing the change from public to private ordering in family law).
198. 4.3% of all children lived away from their parents in 1995. See GREEN
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ate institutional guardians for such children. 19 It would be dan-
gerous to permit such guardians to exercise proxies on behalf of
these children, however. Institutional guardians lack many of the
proposed criteria for effective proxy-holders. They do not have a
personal, emotional commitment to the children and may hardly
know them. They often come from different socioeconomic classes
and fail to fully understand the perspectives of the children. They
are not readily accessible to the children and have insufficient
knowledge of the children's daily lives and experiences.2® They
are accountable to almost no one, and by virtue of their role as
guardian for so many different children, will be tempted to vote
their proxies for the children as a group, rather than for the inter-
ests of the individual children involved. Indeed, vesting so many
votes in a single source would be dangerous, and might even in-
duce unscrupulous politicians to seek the office of guardian just
for political power. In the case of children placed in stable family
foster care, a residential guardian like a grandparent might be an
appropriate proxy-holder; however, that would not work for un-
stable family foster care arrangements or for institutionalized
children. Instead, such proxies would have to be assigned to the
individual who best meets the criteria for each particular child.
The best proxy-holders would know and live with the children, be
emotionally involved, available, and accountable to the children.
Proxies would grant children access to a key element in the politi-
cal bargaining process-the vote.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONALrrY OF PARENTAL PRoxY VOTiNG
1. Is Proxy Voting for Children Constitutionally Compelled?
The Supreme Court recognizes three constitutional claims
for voting rights violations: denial of the right to vote;20' violation
BOOK, supra note 37, at 1181.
199. For examples of state statutes describing the duties of the Public Guard-
ian, see ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.380 (Michie 1996); FLA STAT. ANN. § 744.704 (West
1997); ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-5 (West 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §
5-607 (West 1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-7-104 (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-
7-103 (Michie 1997).
200. See Margaret O'Brien Steinfels, Children's Rights, Parental Rights,
Family Privacy, and Family Autonomy, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD: THE
PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT 230 (Willard Gaylin & Ruth Macklin eds.,
1982) (critiquing professionals as proxy holders for children because
"professionals may lack the resources, skills, and intimate knowledge of the
child necessary to represent and meet his or her interests").
201. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon,
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of the principle of one person, one vote (dilution);202 and racial
gerrymandering. 3 In theory, children might claim both denial
and dilution, but the former claim is not likely to be successful
because the Court is unlikely to rule that children have a consti-
tutional right to vote in the first place. When the Court refers to
a fundamental right to vote,20 it does not mean that the govern-
ment must provide every citizen voting rights. Instead, it means
that voting is important enough to require government to extend
the vote evenly in accordance with the Equal Protection
Clause.205 Hence, even denial claims tend to be viewed as equal
protection problems. Equal protection affords little safety for
children, who are different from adults, and therefore subject to
different rules.2
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment also seems to undercut the
argument that proxy voting for children is constitutionally re-
quired. The Amendment prohibits vote discrimination on ac-
count of age against individuals who are at least eighteen years
old.07 Implicitly, that language seems to permit discrimination
against younger individuals. States are not required to exclude
younger voters, though. As one court explained it, "[The
Twenty-Sixth Amendment] does not preclude, however, a state
286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
202. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568-76 (1964) (requiring that
state legislative districts be reapportioned to achieve one person, one vote);
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-81 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962) (holding one person, one vote claims justiciable).
203. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
204. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626
(1969); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966);
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
205. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 1460-61
(2d ed. 1988).
206. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). In that case, Congress
had enacted legislation mandating that states permit 18-year-olds to vote.
See id. at 117. The Supreme Court struck down that portion of the legislation
noting that the Equal Protection Clause did not require such a result. See id.
at 130. Congress was permitted to require the 18-year-old vote in national
elections. See id. The courts have consistently rejected equal protection
challenges to laws that apply a different rule to children. See, e.g., D.W. v.
Poundstone, 165 F.R.D. 661, 675 (M.D. Ala. 1996), affd sub nom. D.W. v.
Rogers, 113 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that preferential admission
for adults to the state mental institution did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause because adults do not have the same support structures as children);
Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that it does
not violate due process to restrict minors' right to marry).
207. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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from extending the right to vote to persons younger than eight-
een."28 In essence, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment leaves to the
states the decision of whether to provide voting power to chil-
dren. Parental proxies are merely one mechanism states could
use to extend the vote to those under the age of eighteen.
Minors might seem to have a stronger argument for proxy
voting based on the principle of one person, one vote, which
makes "equal representation for equal numbers of people the
fundamental goal .... "I The one person, one vote rule protects
against vote dilution: "[I]f a State should provide that the votes
of citizens... should be given two times, or five times, or 10
times the weight of votes of [others] ... it could hardly be con-
tended that the right to vote.., had not been effectively di-
luted."2'0 That is precisely what happens to individuals in fami-
lies. Adults without children comprise only thirty-four percent
of the population, but they control forty-six percent of the votes.
That extra voting power effectively dilutes the votes of everyone
else.
Consider, for example, two households. One consists of two
parents and their two children, or four individuals. The other
consists of two adult individuals. Currently, the four individuals
in the first household only have two votes. Two of the individu-
als are excluded from political influence. In the other household,
both the individuals have votes and no one is excluded. While
the adults without children will vote based on their own needs
and preferences, the adults with children will essentially split
their votes in half so they represent their own needs and the
needs of their children. Consequently, the voting power avail-
able to the childless individuals is almost double the voting
power available to the individuals living with children."' Paren-
tal proxy voting provides a remedy: The balance of power shifts
to equalize the votes on aper capita basis.
Nevertheless, the Court may not be sympathetic to this ar-
gument. Its approach will depend on how it defines the principle
of one person, one vote; there is some debate over whether this
208. Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), affd 791
F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
209. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
210. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
211. According to 1990 Census data based on the average congressional
voting district, individuals in childless households as a group have approxi-
mately 140% of the voting power of households with children. See supra notes
8-10 and accompanying text.
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principle means one person, one vote-or one voter, one vote."'
This problem arises from the fact that children and resident ali-
ens are disenfranchised. Accordingly, in creating legislative dis-
tricts, it is unclear whether we should count all the people who
live there or only the voters. The answer depends on how we
define the right to vote. If it means the right to be represented
and to have equal access to our representatives, then we should
count all residents, including children and aliens. If, however,
the right to vote is the right to preserve a particular balance of
power among existing voters, then we should only count regis-
tered voters. This issue came to a head in Garza v. County of
Los Angeles.2P3 The Ninth Circuit held that children and resi-
dent aliens should be included because one person, one vote was
meant to protect individuals' access to their representatives,
whether they were entitled to vote or not. That ruling both helped
and hurt children's claim for enfranchisement. It establishes the
principle that children need to be represented in the political
process, and counts them as individuals for one person, one vote
purposes. However, it assumes that children validly are ex-
cluded from the franchise and that any resulting harm can be
addressed by apportionment. Although the Supreme Court has
not specifically addressed the issue raised in Garza, it has held
that it is permissible to count only registered voters.2"4 Thus, it
seems unlikely that the Court will hold that states must extend
the vote to children either directly or through proxies.
212. See, e.g., Aide Cristina Cabeza, Total Population: A Constitutional
Basis for Reapportionment Reaffirmed in Garza v. Los Angeles County, 13
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 74 (1993); Rodolfo 0. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio,
Save the Baby, Change the Bathwater, and Scrub the Tub: Latino Electoral
Participation After Seventeen Years of Voting Rights Act Coverage, 71 TEx. L.
REV. 1479 (1993); Carl E. Goldfarb, Allocating the Local Apportionment Pie:
What Portion of Resident Aliens?, 104 YALE L.J. 1441 (1995); John B. Manning
Jr., The Equal Protection Clause in District Reapportionment: Representa-
tional Equality Versus Voting Equality-Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 25
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1243 (1991); Dennis L. Murphy, Garza v. County of Los
Angeles: The Dilemma over Using Elector Population as Opposed to Total
Population in Legislative Apportionment, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1013
(1991); Scot A. Reader, One Person, One Vote Revisited: Choosing a Popula-
tion Basis to Form Political Districts, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY, 521 (1994).
213. 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990).
214. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92-93 (1966).
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2. Does the Constitution Permit Children to Vote, Directly or
Indirectly?
Opponents of parental proxies would have to base any con-
stitutional challenges on one of the three categories of voting
violations: denial, dilution, or gerrymandering. Extending the
vote to children through their parents neither denies anyone the
vote nor gerrymanders any particular district. Accordingly, any
constitutional complaint is likely to allege that parental proxies
dilute the vote and violate the principle of one person, one vote.
The general rule is that political entities can expand,215 but
not contract, the electorate.1 6 The proper constitutional standard
for expansion of the franchise is the rational basis test, which
permits states to expand the franchise so long as they have a
rational reason for doing so. 217  Any stricter standard would
"leave the scope of the franchise static and virtually unchange-
able."218 Some school districts have taken advantage of this rule
to permit noncitizens with children in the school system to vote
in school board elections.2 9 In fact, several states permitted
resident aliens to vote at one time.22° Permitting children to vote
215. See, e.g., Duncan v. Coffee County, 69 F.3d 88, 94-98 (6th Cir. 1995)
(permitting a school district to expand its franchise to include county resi-
dents because they had a substantial interest in the school district); Glisson v.
Mayor of Savannah Beach, 346 F.2d 135, 136-37 (5th Cir. 1965) (permitting a
city to expand the franchise to nonresidents who owned property in the city);
Brown v. Board of Comm'rs, 722 F. Supp. 380, 400 (E.D. Tenn. 1989)
(permitting a city to expand the franchise to include nonresidents); Snead v.
City of Albuquerque, 663 F. Supp. 1084, 1087-89 (D.N.M. 1987), aff'd, 841
F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1987) (permitting nonresident taxpayers to vote in mu-
nicipal bond elections). But see Locklear v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elec-
tions, 514 F.2d 1152, 1155 (4th Cir. 1975), affd, 529 F.2d 515 (4th Cir. 1975)
(holding that statute permitting city residents to vote in county school board
elections diluted the county votes).
216. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 630-33
(1969) (holding that a school district could not exclude those who did not own
property within the district from voting).
217. See Duncan, 69 F.3d at 94. But see Locklear, 514 F.2d at 1155
(holding that only a compelling state interest would justify the expansion of
the franchise when there was a claim of geographical vote dilution).
218. Duncan, 69 F.3d at 95.
219. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-c(4) (McKinney 1978-79); see also Ambach
v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 n.15 (1979) (noting that the New York State Edu-
cation Commissioner has interpreted New York statutes to permit alien par-
ents to participate in school boards). The statute was amended in 1980 to
limit voting to citizens. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-c(4) (McKinney 1980).
220. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981 (1859) (speech by Senator
Bingham condemning Oregon for permitting resident aliens to vote and not-
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through their parents is merely another valid expansion of the
franchise. As one court explained it: "Merely expanding the
voter rolls is, standing alone, insufficient to make out a claim of
vote dilution .... If a political entity... [lowers] the voting age,
it... dilutes the votes of those already registered .... But it
does not do so unconstitutionally .... 1
Not surprisingly, the childless may be opposed to such a
shift, arguing that they should not be penalized for their choice
not to have children. Proxy voting acts as a penalty, however,
only if disproportionate voting power is an entitlement. Child-
less individuals enjoy enhanced voting power because some citi-
zens (children) are excluded from the franchise. Similarly, most
voters enjoyed enhanced voting power because informal regis-
tration policies at the state and county levels historically made it
difficult for working class and poor people to register to vote.2n
These privileged voters had no grounds to complain when regis-
tration policies were changed to be more open to working class
and poor votersPm Although the electoral power of existing voters
ing four other states that permit resident aliens to vote, including Indiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin); see also GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS To THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDA-
MENTAL LAW 63-70 (1996); Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage,
25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114 (1931). Several commentators suggest expanding
the franchise to include resident aliens. See Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the
People" Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 259 (1992); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The His-
torical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1391 (1993); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why
Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977).
221. Duncan, 69 F.3d at 94-95.
222. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 67, at 196-200; Dayna L. Cunning-
ham, Who Are To Be the Electors?: A Reflection on the History of Voter Regis-
tration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POLy REV. 370, 386 (1991)
(describing the reasons why decades of attempts at reforming the voter regis-
tration system failed for so long); Mark Thomas Quinlivan, One Person, One
Vote Revisited: The Impending Necessity of Judicial Intervention in the Realm
of Voter Registration, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2361, 2372-75 (1989) (describing laws
that disenfranchise voters, particularly minorities, the young, and the urban
poor, by making it difficult to register to vote).
223. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 67, at 220-21, 237-39 (discussing
the reform efforts and movement toward motor voter laws). These efforts
came to fruition in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §
1973 (1994). For a discussion of the legislative purpose, see H.R. REP. No.
103-9, at 2-5 ( 1993). Federal courts have consistently upheld the motor voter
law. See Association of Community Org. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d
791 (7th Cir. 1995); Condon v. Reno, 913 F. Supp. 946 (D.S.C. 1995); Associa-
tion of Community Org. for Reform Now v. Miller, 912 F. Supp. 976 (W.D.
Mich. 1995), affd, 129 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997).
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may have been diminished by motor voter laws, those voters had
no vested right to retain their disparate voting power. Similarly,
childless households have no vested right to retain their in-
creased voting power. Although the Supreme Court consistently
has permitted those who have been excluded from the fran-
chise' and those who have diminished voting power' to get
remedies, it has never created vested constitutional rights in
permanently excluding the unrepresented and underrepre-
sented. Therefore, a law to expand the franchise to children
through proxies would be both desirable and constitutional, be-
cause neither the Constitution nor sound public policy requires
that we give disproportionate electoral power to childless indi-
viduals.
3. Is Proxy Voting for Children Constitutionally Permitted?
Childless voters might argue that although the state could
choose to extend the franchise to younger voters directly, it can-
not create proxies without violating the principle of one person,
one vote. After all, taken very literally and mechanically, proxy
voting seems to give some individuals more say in the political
process than others because parents may cast more than one
vote. If, however, children are viewed as persons with a right to
be represented in the political process, then the principle of one
person, one vote authorizes, if not requires, such proxies. That
principle emerged from a commitment to "achieving... fair and
effective representation for all citizens. n"26 Without proxies,
twenty-six percent of our citizens are left without a vote or any
form of representation whatsoever. Proxies will not result in any
given legislative district being overrepresented or underrepre-
sented relative to its population. Hence, it will serve rather than
violate both the letter and the spirit of the one person, one vote
requirement.
Although proxies seem novel, the entire system of represen-
tative government is really just a system of proxies. Legislators
224. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 630-
33 (1969) (holding that a school district could not exclude nonparents and in-
dividuals who do not hold property from voting).
225. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (invalidating vote di-
lution on equal protection grounds); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(establishing the principle of one person, one vote); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960) (invalidating racial vote dilution on Fifteenth Amendment
grounds).
226. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565-66.
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are given proxies by their constituents to vote on their behalf.27
Similarly when voters elect delegates to presidential nominating
conventions, they give their delegates proxies to vote on their
behalf. Although these proxies may be limited to a particular
candidate on the first ballot, thereafter the delegate is free to ex-
ercise his or her own judgment without any accountability.
Delegates are not subject to any electoral control once the con-
vention goes past the first ballot and they routinely negotiate
with each other to throw their votes behind a given candidate as
a second choice. As a result, single delegates or groups of dele-
gates often control many votes at once. In essence that amounts
to proxy voting.
The alternative to including children through proxies is to
completely exclude them from the political participation. Al-
though the current Court is unlikely to require proxy voting for
children, the more important point is that such proxies are con-
stitutionally permissible. Thus, if a political subdivision like a
school district chooses to adopt it, it should survive constitu-
tional scrutiny.
D. THE WISDOM OF PARENTAL PROXIES
Parental proxies would shift the balance of power in the
electorate because it would add votes for the twenty-six percent
of the population currently disenfranchised. Of course parents
will differ about what is in the best interest of their children.
For example, parents in affluent suburbs may vote for candi-
dates who support local funding for schools. In contrast, parents
who live in poorer urban areas may prefer candidates who support
statewide funding for schools. In another scenario, two parents
may differ about how the proxy vote for the same child should be
cast, with each parent casting their additional half-vote differ-
ently. Nevertheless, such an increase in the franchise would
likely shift power.
Four sorts of concerns arise from this shift of power: (1) that
the increased voting power will be used to advance purely selfish
interests; (2) that the proxies will have adverse consequences
that outweigh the value of the proxies; (3) that the power will be
misallocated to unworthy recipients; and (4) that any shift in
power is unnecessary and ineffective.
227. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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Interest group politics assumes that we all act in our own
best interests and that the public good, if it exists, will emerge
from carefully balancing the power among various groups.
Power is difficult to balance perfectly, however, and the strong
may impose inappropriate burdens on the weak. Parental
proxies shift power so the childless may argue that parents will
be able to push their costs onto those who declined to have chil-
dren. The argument is likely to be that those who enjoy the
benefits of a given project should pay the costs, both as a matter
of fairness, and to ensure that there is a careful balance between
costs and benefits. In economic terms, the complaint is that par-
ents will have the political clout to externalize the costs of raising
children. That argument makes sense only if we think of chil-
dren as the mere personal preferences of their parents. In es-
sence it treats children as if they were consumer goods that in-
dividual parents choose to acquire. If children are not merely
the property of their parents, however, but rather full members
of the community, then the community will have some respon-
sibility for children as well. Children are an integral part of our
social and economic lives. Today's children do not only become
tomorrow's criminals; they also become society's workers, tax-
payers, and leaders. If the economy is to have qualified workers
who can contribute tax dollars toward tomorrow's needs, then
the community needs to invest in those workers now. The
childless, as well as parents, will receive the benefits from the
next generation's taxes. In fact, to the extent that the cost of de-
veloping a competent workforce is thrust upon only a portion of
the population (parents), the childless are free riders who do not
bear their share of the cost of producing future workers. Investing
in children is an investment in our communal future.
This problem is likely to be exacerbated as the baby boom
generation ages. The aging population may be tempted to usurp
a disproportionate share of the assets and push the costs of
funding their programs onto subsequent generations. The gen-
eration sandwiched between supporting elderly parents and
raising young children may become dramatically overburdened.
To the extent conflicts develop between the elderly and children,
disenfranchised children will be at a tremendous disadvantage.
The communal duty to children is not merely economic.
Children not only contribute as future workers, they either en-
rich or debase our communal lives in childhood as well. They
are just as entitled as any other group to have their needs and
interests considered in the political bargaining process.
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Although we may need to account for children's political in-
terests, the childless may argue that parental proxies are far too
broad because they enable parents to use their voting power on
issues that do not affect children. This argument is illusory be-
cause all issues affect children either directly or indirectly. For
example, if a political candidate advocates an increase in the de-
fense budget, that affects children in two ways. First, children
need to be safe from foreign invasion just as adults do. Second,
decisions on defense spending affect other allocations such as edu-
cational spending. Consequently, it is unfair to exclude children's
interests from the bargaining process on any issue.
Even if proxies are a good idea they may have some adverse
consequences. Because proxy voting may shift some electoral
power from the childless, it may be accused of being pronatalist.
It would reward those who have more children with more politi-
cal power. Given the financial cost and emotional effort required
to raise children, however, it seems almost absurd to suggest
that someone would consciously choose to have a child just to
gain an extra vote.P The marginal value of the vote would be
unlikely to exceed the costs incurred.
Although the costs would not be justified for any given indi-
vidual, groups might seek to gain power by increasing popula-
tion. Parental proxies do not create this problem, however.
Those groups that seek to increase their power through prona-
talist policies already have those policies in place. At most,
proxies would create a slight incentive that may accelerate the
process. Including children in political bargaining would pro-
vide benefits to widely varied communities, and the value of a
single vote would not likely be worth the cost of additional chil-
dren, unless there were already additional reasons for strong
pronatalist policies. Hence the value of the proxies for children
outweighs the slight concern about pronatalism.
Proxies may also unwittingly advance the interests of
groups that already are committed to pronatal policies for other
reasons. For example, many religious groups, including funda-
mentalist Mormons, 9 Roman Catholics, fundamentalist Chris-
228. The amount it costs to raise a child varies by income. Families with
average annual incomes of $14,500 spend $104,400 to raise each child to age
eighteen, while more middle class families with average incomes of $52,600
spend $219,810 to raise each child. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ExPENDITURES
ON CHILDREN BY FAMILIES, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT, PUB. No. 1528-1996 tbl.7
(1996).
229. Although banned by the official Church of Latter Day Saints, fimda-
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tians, and orthodox Jews have doctrines that are pronatal in ef-
fect, if not in design210 Similarly, different ethnic groups have
different birth rates.' Parental proxies would provide these
groups with increased voting power. That leads to the concern
that parental proxies would misallocate electoral power.
Opponents of parental proxies fear a shift in electoral power
because the "wrong" people would be empowered. At best, this
argument is elitist and favors hierarchical power. It assumes
that those who currently hold power have a monopoly on reason
and the capacity for self-government. One branch of liberal politi-
cal theory expressly embraces this idea, that a natural aristoc-
racy (those who possess superior reasoning power and wisdom)
should represent the common people. These representatives do
not consult the will of the people, but exercise their own superior
skills for the benefit of the people. That was essentially the
philosophy of Edmund Burke.22 Any expansion of the franchise
is necessarily a threat to the quality of government. Of course,
that more nearly describes an oligarchy than a republican de-
mocracy. m Although there has been a modern resurgence of in-
terest in the idea of deliberative democracy,24 limiting the fran-
mentalist Mormon communities continue to practice polygamy. See, e.g., In re
Black, 283 P.2d 887, 907-08 (Utah 1955) (upholding a prosecution of neglect
charges against a father of 26 children on the sole ground that he practiced
religious polygamy).
230. Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Dis-
putes: Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1702 (1984).
231 See, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE & ECONOMICS & STATISTICS,
ADMIN. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1997: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK 75 (1997).
232. BuRKE'S POLITICS, supra note 69, at 397-98. For an excellent de-
scription of Burke's political philosophy of representation, see PITIKN, supra
note 148, at 168-89. Accordingly, Burke favored restrictions on who could
vote and was concerned about the competency of the electorate. See id. at
171.
233. For a discussion of the differences among these forms of government,
see Aristotle, The Theory of Citizenship and Constitutions, in THE POLITICS OF
ARISTOTLE 110-13 (Ernest Barker ed., 1962); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 57
(James Madison) (responding to criticisms that the large congressional dis-
tricts will render so few leaders relative to the number of citizens as to consti-
tate an oligarchy).
234234. See generally Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up". Minority Politi-
cal Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449
(1988); David M. Estlund, Who's Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the
Strategic/Deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71
TEX. L. REV. 1437 (1993); Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Repub-
lican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democ-
racy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329 (1994); Lani Guinier, More Democracy, 1995 U. Cm1.
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chise to assure the election of a natural aristocracy seems elitist
in our modem multicultural society. Even Burke recognized
that when a group has serious substantive grievances that are
not being met, that group needs the vote. 5  Accordingly, al-
though Burke disfavored universal franchise, he was in favor of
securing parliamentary representation for the Catholics in Ire-
land.Y6 Children, like the Catholics in Ireland, have serious
substantive grievances that require the vote.
Assuming that those who fear the "wrong" people voting are
acting from a principled view of representative politics may give
them far too much credit. At its worst, this argument is a bla-
tantly self-interested attempt to preserve privilege at the ex-
pense of others. It may even be a covert way to diminish voting
power for minorities and the poor. Fears about the "wrong"
people voting are not only elitist, however; they are exaggerated
as well. Because poor families on average are slightly smaller
than other families in the United States,' 7 most of their electoral
gains will be offset by similar gains by the middle class. Some
groups that already vote in large numbers are also likely to be
beneficiaries of the proxy system. For instance, orthodox relig-
ious groups often have large families that would carry extra
votes. More importantly, however, fears of increased power for
the "wrong" voters are elitist and anti-democratic. The existing
power structure is not entitled to maintain its power at the ex-
pense of children, rich or poor, religious or secular.
A more justified criticism is that the proxy system may in-
crease the electoral power of the most powerful. The poor are
the least likely to vote, so the proxies of poor children may never
be used.P8 Proxies will not change the practical reasons the poor
LEGAL F. 1; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Suzanna Sherry, su-
pra note 16; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).
235. See PITKIN, supra note 148, at 178.
236. See BURIE'S POLITICS, supra note 69.
237. "The average AFDC family is either about the same size or slightly
smaller than the average non-AFDC family." JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY
OF WELFARE REFORM 46 (1995). The average family on welfare has 1.8 chil-
dren. See GREEN BoOIK, supra note 37, at 473. The average family has 1.86
children. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, Average
Number of Own Children Under 18 Per Family by Type of Family: 1995 to
Present (1996) <http:/www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.htnl
/rep96/96fin3.txt>.
238. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 67, at 212. Voter participation is
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don't vote, such as lack of transportation or time off work to get
to the polls. In contrast, parents who already vote will almost
undoubtedly use their increased voting power. Hence, it is pos-
sible that the proxy system will entrench or expand power dis-
parities. If part of the reason the poor do not vote is that no vi-
able candidates represent their interests,"9 however, a proxy
system may help. Currently, major political parties have little
incentive to court the votes of the poor because they are unlikely
to vote in sufficient numbers to affect elections. If poor single
parents had a vote for each child, the typical single parent would
have three votes: one for the parent and one for each child.2"°
That kind of voting concentration should make the political parties
more interested in recruiting the votes of poor single parents,
both by providing practical help in getting to the polls and in of-
fering more sympathetic candidates.
If single parents get more power under a proxy system, then
some may complain that parental proxies gives disproportionate
power to women. Currently, the vast majority of single parent
homes are headed by women.241 Widows outnumber widowers
because women tend to outlive men242 and dead dads cannot
vote, even in Chicago. Similarly, women are more likely to re-
ceive residential custody of their children upon divorce because
men do not generally object. In one study, divorcing parents
were asked if they personally wanted to have sole residential
custody of their children. Eighty-two percent of the mothers
wanted to live with their children full time, but only thirty-two
percent of the fathers did.24 Parents agree on sole maternal cus-
tody seventy-two percent of the time.21 Voting proxies for resi-
dential parents will only favor women so long as men choose not
highly correlated to income. In 1994, only one-fifth of those with a family in-
come of under $5000 voted, while a third of those with a family income of less
than $14,999 voted, and half of those with a family income over $35,000 voted.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, Characteristics of
the Voting-Age Population Reported Having Registered or Voted: November
1994, at tbl.1 (1996) <http//www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting
/profile /ptablel.txt>.
239. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 67, at 20-21.
240. The average welfare family consists of 2.8 people, or a parent and 1.8
children. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 37, at 473.
241. In 1995, 87% of children who lived with only one parent resided with
their mothers. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 37, at 1181.
242. In 1990, women's life expectancy was 78.8 years, while men's was 71.8
years. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 37, at 955.
243. See DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 47 (Stephen D. Sugarnan
& Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
244. See id. at 52-53.
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to assume daily responsibility for their children. Both men and
women would share the vote equally when they reside with their
children.
However, there is an apparent inconsistency in the argu-
ment for parental proxies. If parents are adequate to virtually
represent their children with proxies, why aren't children al-
ready represented? That critique assumes a purely deliberative
view of politics. The theory is that a legislature acts as a forum
to debate the best interests of the whole in light of separate in-
terests.2" That requires that each separate interest be pre-
sented to the legislature so that the legislators are sufficiently
informed to make a sound decision. Under the deliberative view,
the number of representatives is irrelevant because public-
spirited legislators will judge the merits without regard to the
electoral strength of the interests. Thus, those who believe that
children are represented adequately reject a pluralist or interest
group theory of politics. The pluralist view sees politics not as
grand debate on social policy, but as the aggregation of compet-
ing demands of various interest groups that form shifting alli-
ances.2" Groups need proportionate voting strength and the
power to affect future elections. Without such strength, repre-
sentation risks becoming mere tokenism.247
Sometimes deliberative politics seems to work. The minority
persuades the majority to treat it fairly. That is arguably what
happened with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the subsequent
voting rights acts.2' But deliberative politics does not always
245. See BuRKE's POLITICs, supra note 69, at 116 ("Parliament is not a
congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests... but... is a
deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole .... ").
246. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 46-47
(1985) (noting that decentralized power spread among a variety of political,
religious, social, and cultural organizations was a necessary but not sufficient
condition for democracy); ROBERT A. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 37-
41 (3d ed. 1976) (explaining that there is no prime mover that controls politi-
cal influence, but that political influence is exerted by many different indi-
viduals and groups).
247. For a similar argument in the context of race, see Guinier, Tokenism,
supra note 5, at 1110, 1123 (arguing that small numbers of African-American
representatives risk becoming mere tokens who cannot adequately influence
policy or build necessary coalitions). Guinier, however, does not think that
merely getting proportionate representation is sufficient, since permanent
minorities may still be frozen out of the legislative discourse. See id. at 1125.
248. Of course, implicit threats of unrest may have helped to persuade the
majority. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 419-20 (1967) (discussing the how demon-
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work. Sometimes wealthy, well-organized special interest
groups form powerful lobbies to advance their interests.249
Similarly, other positions fail not because the claims are inequi-
table, but because they are not backed by sufficient political
power. Politics is neither purely deliberative, nor purely plural-
ist."° Appeals to virtue may persuade some political actors, but
only if the appeals are strong enough to be heard and be influ-
ential. Voting power is one measure of political influence. We
need parental proxies so that the interests of children are not
only heard, but adequately represented in the political debate.
Finally, opponents may argue that the franchise is not a
strong enough tool to change anything. The elderly not only had
the votes, but they had the ability to organize themselves into
one of the most powerful lobbying groups in the country. Public
choice theorists have long posited that those who can organize
realize the most gains."' Parental proxies will not enable chil-
dren to organize on their own behalf or give them the resources
they need to lobby. Proxies will, however, create the incentive
for parents and political parties to organize and lobby on behalf
of children. Imagine how much more powerful groups like the
Childrens' Legal Defense Fund"2 would be if they could marshal
strations contributed to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Neal
Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1033, 1039 (1992) (reviewing
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)). The Civil Rights Act may also have been an effort
to maintain a Democratic coalition that consolidated Lyndon Johnson's politi-
cal power.
249. See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law:
Considering Inherent Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1996)
(explaining how two concentrated interest groups, large landowners and envi-
ronmentalists, compete for economic rents in the legislature); Enrico Colom-
batto & Jonathan R. Macey, Path-Dependence, Public Choice, and Transition
in Russia: A Bargaining Approach, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 379, 386
(1995) (explaining that public choice theory recognizes that well-organized
special interest groups are better able to provide the political support that
politicians need to survive than are highly diffuse, disorganized citizens).
250. Thus, Madison sought a balance between interest group representa-
tion and deliberation. See RAKOVE, supra note 142, at 239.
251 See William N. Eskridge Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications
of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 286
(1988) (noting that groups need to be well organized to garner much attention
from legislatures); Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence
of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 878-79 (1987) (explaining that different
public choice models agree that interest groups get a great deal of attention
from politicians).
252. Any number of child organizations already exist to help children, in-
cluding the Children's Rights Coalition, Children's Watch, and the National
Association of Child Advocates.
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millions of votes for their causes. Even if parental proxies would
not actually increase power for children, however, they would
serve a critical function. Parental proxies would undermine the
connection between autonomy and rights, thereby opening the
door to rights of protection for children.
CONCLUSION
Liberal theory focuses on autonomous individuals. That focus
fails to account either for power imbalances or group obligations.
Proxies for parents answer both the power-based critique and
the communitarian critique. Proxies empower disenfranchised
children, permitting them to be proportionately represented in
the political discourse. Because the proxies are held by residen-
tial parents, proxies also reinforce the "idea of the family as an
interdependent social group.""3
Liberal theory vests rights only in autonomous individuals, so
only the relatively powerful hold rights. Withholding the vote
from those who have not developed the full capacity to reason ex-
cludes our most vulnerable citizens from the political bargaining
process. The disenfranchised have no power. Hence children,
who are by definition dependent, have few rights. The solution
lies neither in lowering the age of autonomy nor in creating un-
specified substantive rights. Instead, we should change how we
think of rights. Rights should not be enforceable choices, but
mechanisms to balance power.
The right to vote is one way to balance power. It enables
voters to express preferences and bargain among those who have
different demands. It has symbolic power as well, announcing
which members of our society are important enough to be
counted. Children are both formally excluded from voting and
underrepresented. As a result, childless individuals have nearly
double the voting power of individuals with children. Although
it is difficult to prove that this disenfranchisement directly
causes harm, children have not shared in the benefits that the
elderly have managed to garner from the legislatures. Children
need the vote, and the only sensible way to give them this power
is to permit proxies for their parents.
253. Steinfels, supra note 200, at 235.
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